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Back in mid-March, when most of us were hearing the words shelter in place for the first time, research labs across the country were busy with what they call saccing. Its short for sacrifice, like for science and the greater good.

There are a lot of different terms that are used that I think people use to protect themselves from the reality of this, said Anneka Allman, a research technician at a University of Pennsylvania lab that works with hundreds of mice as part of cancer studies. Personally, I prefer to say we kill them, but the common term is saccing.

Research mice, you might imagine, generally are not long for this world. At her lab, Allman is usually the one to send them into the hereafter. Most of the mice born there even in normal times arent suitable for experiments for some reason or another.

Id say maybe we only actually use like a tenth of the mice that we breed, Allman said. Euthanizing these mice on a regular basis is just part of the job, and its not a fun part of the job, but it is a necessity.

Still, what happened back in March, on Friday the 13th, it was different it was a massacre.

We have a weekly lab meeting and we had it virtually, and we were like, OK, we need to figure out how to shut everything down she recalled.

They had some 500 cages of mice, and a looming stay-at-home order for most staff. You just cant take that many mice home with you, and many cant survive outside sterile settings. So most of the mice, they were going to get sacced.

It was just like piles and piles of cages just on top of each other empty cages, Allman said.

She personally euthanized hundreds of the mice.

Its actually very simple. You take their cages, take off the tops, put it in a machine called the Euthan-X which I have a lot of feelings about, but its essentially just a CO2 chamber, Allman said. And you turn the button on, and you wait for 20 minutes to half an hour, and they die.

Allman only worked that Friday before she was sent home for safety, but a skeleton crew stayed behind and saccing continued.

We did get an email about, I think, two weeks in that basically requested that we stop asking them to do it because of the emotional toll that it was having on them because of the masses that they had to kill, Allman said.

The animals deaths didnt hit her on that level. Before you get the wrong idea about Allman, know shes a self-described animal lover, a vegetarian; one of her pet cats scurried across her laptop during an interview. But she didnt mourn the euthanized mice, so much as the science the mice represented.

I had to kill mice that I had planned experiments for, that Im still upset theyre dead and not because of their lives, unfortunately for them, but because to do this research its going to be a lot. Its going to take a lot longer.

Untold thousands of mice were sacced in the early weeks of the United States pandemic response. The animals in Allmans lab, and in hundreds of labs like it, are the bedrock of research into human diseases.

Pick a disorder, an illness. Theres a mouse model for that, a mouse created specifically to study that disease.

Cat Lutz is director of the mouse repository at the Jackson Laboratory in Maine.

So whatever disease you can think of, you know, epilepsy, obesity, metabolic syndrome, anything that you can think of, we have a mouse model that you can genetically engineer to recapitulate that particular disease, Lutz said.

The Jackson Lab is a nonprofit where many labs get founder mice to start colonies of their own for research. It has about 11,000 strains of designer mice cryopreserved in its repository 80% of which dont exist anywhere else.

Mice first found their way into labs by way of so-called mouse fanciers.

They would keep mice as pets, and they would also select those mice that had spontaneous mutations, for example, coat color or ears or craniofacial features, long tails, kinky tails, maybe spotted mice or things like that, and they would start inbreeding them, Lutz said.

Mice breed very quickly and very often, so mutations tend to spring up fairly regularly. Fanciers were after aesthetic mutations, but scientists quickly found fanciers could provide mice with more utilitarian mutations. This mouse with a kinky tail, it can develop diabetes, or colon cancer, or this rare neurological disease.

Between mouse and humans, the gene conservation is incredibly high at the level of the coding sequence, so it was really quite translational, Lutz said.

Mice and people share about 98% of their genetic code.

The mutations that you would see in the mice would often translate to the mutations that you see in people, she said. They really have become the model animal for humans.

So if you can cure a cancer in a mouse, thats a step closer toward curing it in a person.

Editors note: In a previous version of this story, the term saccing was misidentified. Saccing is short for sacrificing.

Read the original:
The great research mouse rescue amid the pandemic - WHYY

By Mike Baker

SEATTLE: In a county north of Seattle, two people who came down with respiratory illnesses in December now have antibodies for the coronavirus. In Florida, a public health official who got sick in January believes he had COVID-19.

And in California, a surprising discovery that an early-February death in San Jose was linked to the coronavirus has triggered a broader search for how that person was exposed.

Those cases have contributed to growing questions about when the virus first reached the United States and how long it had been circulating by the time its arrival was publicly confirmed in Washington state at the end of February.

While there was limited testing to uncover specific cases before then, researchers have other tools to trace the path of the coronavirus. That includes genomic sequencing of the virus to help scientists build an ancestral tree of cases, a re-examination of specific deaths, and thousands of old flu samples that have been repurposed to look for coronavirus.

Heres a look at the evidence and what it shows:

Q: I got really sick in February. Did I have coronavirus?

A: Its possible, but it was most likely something else.

The Seattle area emerged as an early epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak at the end of February, but there is compelling evidence that, even there, the virus didnt yet have much of a foothold compared to the flu, which had a particularly potent season.

A team that analyzes flu trends in the region has been able to review nearly 7,000 old flu samples collected from around the region in January and February, re-examining them for coronavirus. All of the samples from January were negative. The earliest sample that tested positive was February 20.

Based on that and later case counts, Trevor Bedford, who studies the evolution of viruses at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle, and who was part of the flu study team, estimated that there were probably a few hundred cases in the area by that point in February.

But even that would still be a small fraction perhaps less than 1% of the many thousands of people who had flu symptoms at the time.

Q: When did the coronavirus first reach the United States?

A: The U.S. first identified cases among travelers who had flown in from Wuhan, China, in the middle of January. Officials worked to contain them.

There is some evidence that the virus began getting a bit of traction around the end of January. To seed that late-February emergence in the Seattle area, researchers believe the spread could have begun with a traveler who arrived in the region from Wuhan on Jan. 15, or it may have been another unknown case that arrived in the few weeks that followed.

In San Jose, tissue sampling from a woman who died on Feb. 6 revealed that she was probably the first known person in the U.S. whose death was linked to the coronavirus a strong sign that the virus may have been circulating in that part of Northern California in January.

Q: But was it part of a large, previously unrecognized outbreak?

A: Dr. George Rutherford, a professor of epidemiology and biostatistics at the University of California, San Francisco, theorized that perhaps the woman, who worked for a company that had an office in Wuhan, was one of only a small number of people who contracted the virus at that time and that transmissions probably petered out for some reason. Otherwise, he said, the region would have seen a much bigger outbreak.

With that kind of early introduction, we should be seeing thousands of more cases, Rutherford said.

Dr. Sara Cody, the health officer for Santa Clara County, said local, state and federal officials were continuing to try to answer those questions.

There are other, less concrete signs of earlier infections. In Florida, where the first two official cases were announced on March 1, a state database now lists coronavirus cases in patients who may have had symptoms as far back as January. But the cases are all under investigation, and no one has confirmed that any of those patients had the disease that early.

One of them is Raul Pino, the health officer for the Florida Department of Health in Orange County. He said recently that he suspects he had the virus in the first week of January.

Q: What if the virus quietly arrived in December?

A: Doctors in France have said that a patients sample from late December has since tested positive for coronavirus. But so far, there is no comparable evidence of a similar case in the United States.

The strongest possible indicator so far is new evidence that emerged this week of two people in Snohomish County, Washington, who reported coronavirus-like symptoms in December. Both people later tested positive for antibodies, county health officials announced.

But Dr. Chris Spitters, the countys health officer, said that while it is possible that both people had the coronavirus in December even before officials in China had reported a cluster to the World Health Organization at the end of the month he is doubtful.

Its possible and frankly, I think, more likely that they had a non-COVID respiratory viral illness in December and subsequently had an asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic COVID infection subsequent to that, Spitters said.

Bedford said he also believed this was the more likely scenario, noting that up to half of people with coronavirus infections have no symptoms.

There could have been a tiny number of isolated coronavirus cases among travelers to the United States in December, Bedford said. But its pretty clear that none of them spread.

In part, scientists can tell that by looking at the genomic fingerprints of each case. But another clue is the rapid rate at which the virus spreads, said Rutherford.

It appears that early in the outbreak, one infection was spreading to about four other people, on average, with an incubation period for new infections of about four days. So a case seeded in December would rapidly quadruple through new generations, likely growing exponentially to millions of cases from a single unbroken chain of transmission by the end of February. Researchers arent seeing any chains that appear to go that far back.

Modelers looking back at the growth of outbreaks elsewhere have reached similar conclusions. One estimated that New Yorks outbreak could have begun with perhaps 10 infected people who contracted the virus sometime between the end of January to the middle of February, when the first cases of community transmission were identified and hospitals began seeing more cases.

Q: When did the virus begin in China?

A: The virus first emerged in Wuhan in December after a series of people developed symptoms of a viral pneumonia and an examination found that they had been infected with a new coronavirus.A group of researchers in China later examined the histories of the first 41 lab-confirmed cases at a Wuhan hospital, finding that many of them had connections to a seafood market. But the earliest case, in a person who developed symptoms on Dec. 1, had no connections to the market.

The information suggests that if the virus did originate from the market, it was likely circulating by November, early enough to reach that first person. Bedford said it was conceivable to him that the virus began as early as October, but that November was more likely.

There is no evidence that it started elsewhere. The virus mutates an average of twice a month, something researchers can see in the genomic sequences of individual cases, and all of the cases in Wuhan show close genetic links.

All the other thousands of cases that have been sequenced around the globe show the Wuhan version as an ancestor.

Q: Was the coronavirus made in a lab somewhere?

A: Several unfounded theories that have gained traction suggest that the virus was created or accidentally released in a lab somewhere. The Chinese government speculated that perhaps Americans brought the virus in to China. President Donald Trump has suggested it came from a virology lab in Wuhan.

Bedford said there is no evidence of genetic engineering in the virus, noting that it appears to be a genetic outgrowth of a virus circulating among bats. It likely reached humans through an intermediate animal, such as a pangolin, he said.

Theres no hallmarks of it having been manipulated in a lab, Bedford said. I think thats definitive.

He did not, however, rule out the possibility that some version of the virus being studied by scientists in Wuhan could have somehow escaped and spread from there. But he doubts that is the case. He said that the most prevalent theory about the viruss origins, that it spread naturally among animals at a live animal market in Wuhan, then jumped to humans, is the most likely explanation.

Follow this link:
When did coronavirus arrive in the US? Heres a review of the evidence - Economic Times

The recent exchanges on Ethiopias acceptance of genetically modified (GM) crops and the resulting report of USDA praising the steps our country has taken continue to be informative. My understanding of the debates surrounding GM foods suggests that neat explanations about their usefulness grossly disregard the muddy footprints and messy stories of the technology while the voices of vilification and blanket rejection tend to thrive more on emotional appeal than rigorous science. Lets start with the basics.The 21st century is said to be the century of biology and ecology. Thus, for Ethiopia, as one of the globes top 50 centers of biodiversity, where better to capitalize on than in understanding and developing its crop and animal varieties and fulfill its long-held potential of being Africas breadbasket. Ethiopia is one of the few centers where domestication of crops was practiced at the dawn of agriculture and the country has contributed to the worlds collection of cultivable species such crops as Teff, coffee, enset, sorghum, millet, etc. It means that our farmers are not new to the genetic modification of organisms since every domestication effort involves selective breeding and recombination of desired characteristics. We also have adopted several foreign plant species (maize, wheat, barley, tomatoes, potatoes, pepper, etc.) some of them only a few centuries ago, without much consideration for their effects on our indigenous species.Despite these impressive records, our agricultural system stayed firmly rooted in its ancient practices which suffer from abysmal efficiency and very poor productivity. As a result, Ethiopia remains a net importer of crops both for human consumption and for its expanding industries, and there seems to be no natural end to this depressing trend. The consequence is not only a shrinking of profit base for many of the industries but also the misplaced use of the meager hard currency obtained from the export of some raw materials with all the negative impacts on our capacity in importing more useful technologies.

Ironically, Ethiopia has no shortage of cultivable/irrigable land or population able or willing to participate in modern agricultural practices. In fact, Ethiopias farming community is estimated to be above 80% of the population but is unable to feed itself properly let alone supply raw materials for the manufacturing sector. The production by small scale farmers in Ethiopia is demonstrably incapable of keeping pace with the population growth as tens of millions of our people still depend on food handouts every single year and many more live in precarious situations. Therefore, it is pertinent that the country becomes self-sufficient at least for feeding the population with all possible means. And, this is not a very hard task given the scale of its cultivable land and the disproportionately large population whose livelihood is dependent on farming.The most relevant question is thus how to end this absurdity and persistent tragedy without drastically affecting the livelihood of our farmers and disrupting the biodiversity balance. For a very long period of time, Ethiopia lacked the capacity to introduce mechanized farming and other relevant agricultural technologies. Further, it lagged far behind many (African) countries in developing its policies and relevant practices with regard to the application of plant genetic engineering technology. Arguably the most unhelpful effort on part of the Ethiopian government in the last decade has been the introduction of the Biosafety Proclamation No. 655/2009. It is possible that this proclamation was enacted as a genuine effort to protect the local farmers and the countrys agriculture sector from control by a few foreign biotech industries and create a formidable safeguard against potential fallouts from untended consequences of releasing GM crops. However, it is clear from the outset that the proclamation lacked proper scrutiny by all the relevant stakeholders, not least farmers representatives or experts from agricultural research centers in the country. In addition, it failed to recognize the potential of local agro-biotechnology research and innovation and was oblivious to the rapidly changing focus of the debate and policy shifts surrounding this emerging technology from around the world. Thus, our Biosafety Proclamation No. 655/2009 was, by international standards, relatively outdated as soon as it was hastily passed by the parliament (hence the justification for a later amendment as Proclamation No. 896/2015).It is unclear why modern GM organisms are so divisive and treated as highly toxic materials that should be feared and avoided at all costs. Rigorous analysis done by scientific institutions such as the UK Royal Society and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences has demonstrated that such organisms are at least as safe as their counterparts produced by conventional breeding techniques. For example, the GM cotton that Ethiopia is said to have started cultivating is the widely known Bt variety. In short, Bt is abbreviated from Bacillus thuringiensis, a bacterium species that naturally occurs in soil and produces highly specific insecticidal proteins. This bacterium has been in use, in one form or another, as the most effective, naturally occurring, and environmentally friendly bioinsecticide for more than half-century. Bt spray is currently the dominant bioinsecticide in the world and is authorized for use even by organic farmers worldwide. Therefore, we are talking about a well-characterized gene of a bacterium (which might as well be dwelling in our soils all along). Plants expressing this gene have been tested for more than two decades in several countries and in a wide range of ecological settings for the properties they have been designed for, with no confirmed case of ill effect as food or feed.I suspect that Ethiopia has been misled or pressured into adopting an overly cautious interpretation of the precautionary principle as was the case in the past in some EU countries. In my opinion, the EU and its policies on GM products (even as progressive as they currently are) cannot be a good lead for Ethiopia. For one, farming practices in the EU are already highly productive even without the need for the introduction of GM. In addition, the sheer proportion of the population involved in the agricultural sector in Ethiopia means that unreasonable restrictions on agricultural biotechnology can have far-reaching consequences. For Ethiopia, the better place to look for inspiration is other developing countries around the world in Latin America, Asia, and in the continent of Africa itself for our capacities and needs are likely to be similar.

India, for example, started commercial farming of Bt-cotton in 2002 and at the moment, about 25% of its agricultural land is covered with this variety, the highest proportion in the world. In our continent, South Africa is the pioneer in providing permits for the commercial cultivation of GM crops for GM cotton and maize starting in 1997. Egypt has been commercially farming Bt-maize hybrid since 2008, using seeds procured from South Africa (it has since suspended the cultivation due to the lack of proper biosafety laws and other local issues). Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, and, our neighboring countries, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique have all tested and/or adopted the cultivation of GM crops. Furthermore, Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda are pursuing various genetic modifications to the cassava plant, a staple crop for over half a billion people around the world. It is disingenuous, to say the least, to assert that all of these countries are either threatened or duped into accepting this technology to the detriment of the wellbeing of their population and ecosystems.Ethiopia, on the other hand, despite having several, experienced agricultural research institutions, is missing out for far too long on the development of its genetic research capacity and utilization of available biotechnologies, especially as compared to many of these African countries. As a commentary on this site made it clear, the Ethiopian team negotiating the Cartagena Protocol, led by Dr. Tewolde-Birhan Gebre-Egziabher, played a key role in formulating a strong African position and had become the continents de-facto representative. This had been appreciated and acknowledged by several African countries at that time. Whether this fact can make Ethiopia assume a Pan-Africanist leadership position in the environmental issues is completely irrelevant to the issue at hand. What is important is the fact that the Cartagena Protocol aims mainly to provide an adequate level of protection to worldwide biodiversity by placing a stringent control on the transboundary movement, transit, handling and use of all living modified organisms that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. What it is not is an outright ban on the development, test or use of GM organisms for food or feed. In addition, several of the major African countries have since moved on and have come to realize that application GM crops, transgenic technology, and genetic engineering know-how could have a transformative effect on parts their economies provided that these are supported by a strong monitoring regimen. As a result, and contrary to its supposed pan-African leadership, Ethiopia is currently an outlier in the continent when it comes to the exploration of this powerful technology that can potentially transform the living standards of millions of people. Many of the countries that are said to be hesitant in accepting this agricultural biotechnology lack either the capacity to adapt and manage it or the actual need for a rapid transformation of their agricultural practices (they are either food self-sufficient or have no industrial base to supply to or both). In other words, we may as well have once been the continents leading voice against GM organisms but it has become apparent that we are leading the wrong league and it is not where we belong it is unbecoming to our great nation.What Ethiopia urgently needs is a dynamic regulatory system and strong scientific capacity for the evaluation, authorization, and monitoring of imported GM crops. It also needs to rebuild and expand its capability for fundamental research with the aim of developing local GM species using state-of-the-art methodology. Public-private biotechnology partnerships should be encouraged to work on genetic identification and improvements even in our own indigenous species of plants and animals. Furthermore, since we are negotiating for accession to the World Trade Organization, it is the most relevant time to substantially revise or repeal the Biosafety Proclamation No. 655/2009 (including its latest incarnation, Proclamation No. 896/2015) and streamline other relevant laws in accordance with international standards.

To this writer, the question is not to be why Ethiopia allowed the commercial cultivation of Bt-cotton and has authorized a confined field trial of Bt-maize. It is whether it had conducted a thorough analysis of the existing problems in the sector and identified the effectiveness of these particular strains of GM crops as cost-effective and sustainable solutions. It is not a case of re-inventing the wheel but of identifying our desirable targets and requirements, learning from the front-runners, and applying an appropriate level of precautionary principles. The temporary setbacks in Burkina Faso, Africas largest producer of cotton at one point, and some regions in India demonstrate that the process of introducing GM crops is far from being a turn-key situation. It requires the collaboration of laboratory scientists, policymakers, market leaders, and farmers (end-users) in identifying the required crop characteristic and quality that is suitable for the specific condition of the locality.In conclusion, agricultural gene-modification technology has sufficiently demonstrated its worth after more than two decades of commercial application and this is reflected in its widespread global adoption.Therefore, the excessive hesitance of its acceptance by Ethiopia and campaigners that support this stance is unjustifiable either socially, economically, or more importantly, scientifically.

Main Image: Children at a farm in Hawzen, Tigray region. Ethiopia Observer file.

This article is published under aCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. Please cite Ethiopia Observer prominently and link clearly to the original article if you republish. If you have any queries, please contact us at ethiopiaobserver@protonmail.com. Check individual images for licensing details.

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Why Ethiopia needs to embrace gene-modification technology - ethiopiaobserver.com

SARS-CoV-2 has so far infected more than 4,500,000 people in 187 countries and caused over 300,000 deaths, but no drug or vaccine is yet available. In Bangladesh, over 20,000 people have been infected and 250 died. Lockdown can provide a temporary solution but we need a sustainable solution for this.

Although there are three (A,B,C) SARS-CoV-2 variants, we still don't know which one is prevailing in our country, how and through which route it has been transmitted here; if it has acquired any mutations by now and how deadly it has become. Also, we do not know why some people are affected more, showing serious symptoms, while others remain asymptomatic. We do not know why and how this has created serious havoc in some countries whereas others are only mildly affected.

In the modern era, problems in biological sciences are tackled by a bottom up approach, where we do genome sequencing of the relevant organism and associate it with other metadata to address the problem and find solutions. For the same reason so far 80 countries have deposited more than 24,000 genome sequences of this virus, which includes even countries like Nepal and Vietnam where the coronavirus problem is comparatively less severe. Since the first cases were reported on March 7, 2020 by the country's epidemiology institute IEDCR, we have been repeatedly advocating the need for genome sequencing of this virus. We also ensured that we make substantial advancement in science and technology, especially with the special attention of the prime minister in this sector.

Now we are able to do genome sequencing by Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) in our country. There are some institutes and private organisations where NGS machines are available and virus genome sequencing can be done, and also we have expert and experienced Bioinfomaticians who can perform complete genome sequence analysis. The ground-breaking work has finally been done by the Child Health Research Foundation (CHRF). Dr Senjuti Shaha and Dr Samir Kumar Shaha, along with their team from CHRF, collected samples from a 22-year-old coronavirus infected female patient and arranged to do whole genome sequencing of the virus using Illumina iSeq 100 NGS platform. As soon as the news of deposition of genome sequence data became available on May 12, Tuesday afternoon, we sought to extract this sequence and information from the public repository GISAID and CNCB, and started to explore it.

Lead by me at the Department of Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, University of Dhaka, the Epigenetic and Bioinformatics team on nCoV research has done basic analysis of the genome. My team member Mr Abdullah Al Kamran Khan was with me in this analysis. We compared the sequence with that of the first reported coronavirus genome sequence from Wuhan, Chinawhich is globally considered as "reference". Strikingly, we have found that this genome is very similar (99.7 percent similarity) to that of reference SARS-CoV-2 isolated from Wuhan. There are changes only in nine places and these changes are single nucleotide change (SNP). There are no deletion or insertion/addition of any large sequence compared to the original reference.

However, with great surprise, we observed that this genome has acquired two new mutations which have not been seen among the viruses reported so far and that we have observed closely. At position 1163 (genes orf1ab) a new mutation from A to T has been detected. Previously at the same position nucleotide A to C in one virus and nucleotide A to G changed in another genome reported. Also, there is a brand new mutation position at 17019 detected in our Bangladeshi isolated virus which has not been reported so far. This means that these are the new changes that the virus has acquired after entering into Bangladesh. Out of nine, seven other mutations were very common among the sequenced viruses so far. We can further study what trouble or benefit these new mutations have brought us.

Very interestingly, of these nine mutations, it contains a mutation (Single Nucleotide Mutation or SNP) in its Spike protein. There is non-silent (non-synonymous), amino acid changing (Aspartate to Glycine) mutation at the 614th position of the Spike protein (D614G). This is of particular interest because it is probably due to this mutation that the virus could spread quickly among the European and American populations compared to the original virus from China. This creates an additional serine protease (Elastase) cleavage site near the Open Reading Frame (ORF) S1 and S2 junction of the Spike protein.

The interesting aspect is that in human, a single nucleotide mutation (deletion of C nucleotide, delC) (rs35074065 variant site) in the TMPRSS2 receptor gene facilitates the entry of SARS-CoV-2 with D614G mutation to the cell very effectively. Dr Hemayet Ullah from Howard University, USA, also informed us that this delC mutation is very common in the American and European population but very rare in the East Asian/Asian populationshence the change of amino acid aspartic acid to glycine in the S protein of the virus may be helpful for Asian countries but more infectious in the American and European populations. We do see a less severe effect in Asian countries compared to that in Europe and America. Any deleterious mutation from the perspective of an organism gets lost through natural selection and we hope more virulent mutation does not appear in Asian countries later on. Several research papers are also available on this mutation.

To understand the origin, we have constructed phylogenetic tree (UPGMA and Neighbour-Joining) in MEGA with default parameters, with representative sequences from 60 other countries and the reference sequence, totalling 350 sequences. Phylogenetic tree shows that this Bangladeshi SARS-CoV-2 genome isolate seems closer to European clustermost likely the person got infected from someone who returned from Europe or maybe she herself returned from there. We are fine-tuning the phylogenetic tree. And are also in the process of making phylogenetic tree with 10,000 high quality sequences selected from 80 countries to better explain the origin and route of transmission of this particular virus.

To understand the pattern of infection in Bangladesh, only one genome sequence is not enough. We need sequence of at least 100 isolates. We have made a proposal to the ICT ministry in response to their "Call for Nation (Hakathon)". In this study proposal we aim to create a dataset by combining 100 coronavirus genomes from Bangladeshi patients and integrate this genome information with patient's personal/clinical/treatment/diagnostic and other information. This information will be analysed extensively by computational methods to do clustering, phylogenetic and pharmacogenomics studies, and will compare data with other globally available data to make a concrete information-base that will help pharmaceutical industries produce appropriate drugs and vaccines for our population.

Also, the ICT ministry will be able to announce that Bangladesh has uncovered the genome mystery of the coronavirus circulating in the country and trace back the transmission. This project will be a multicentre research where essential help from ICT/Bangladesh government, and help of IEDCR through the government will be required to get patients' samples and relevant clinical data. We will carry out sequencing (Next Generation Sequencing) of the viral genome and other analyses with our own resources in Bangladesh. If ICT/government support us, it is also possible to do further research in future where in addition to the viral genome we can sequence genome of some individuals who were infected and developed the disease as well as healthy individuals who did not develop the disease. This may also let us know the factors (if any) that conferred resistance to them.

Dr ABMM Khademul Islam, associate professor, Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, University of Dhaka.

Read more from the original source:
Mystery of SARS-CoV-2 genome isolated in Bangladesh - The Daily Star

You may not think of plants as needing life-saving medicine, but that's sometimes the case when bugs and disease strike. Now, scientists have developed a super-accurate, highly delicate way of delivering drugs, and right where plants need them.

At the moment, plants can be sprayed with pesticides, which doesn't really penetrate to the roots, or they can be treated with large needles that aren't particularly precise, and tend to cause damage to the plants.

The new method makes use of microneedles or what the researchers are calling 'phytoinjectors', sitting on top of a silk-based biomaterial patch, which are able to hit a plant's circulatory system directly. Pesticides, in contrast, might travel between the root system and the leaves.

(Cao et al., Advanced Science, 2020)

As well as delivering medicine or nutrients to different parts of the plant, the new mechanism could also be used to take samples of a plant, which are then transferred to a lab for analysis, or even to edit DNA (something the team has successfully tried).

"We wanted to solve the technical problem of how you can have a precise access to the plant vasculature," says mechanical engineer Yunteng Caofrom MIT.

"You can think about delivering micronutrients, or you can think about delivering genes, to change the gene expression of the plant or to basically engineer a plant."

The motivation for the project came from the spread of the citrus greening disease across the US and other parts of the world, which threatens to flatten an industry worth $9 billion if a solution isn't found. Olives and bananas are other fruits under particular threat from disease across the world right now.

Previous work looking at the use of microneedles to deliver human vaccines was used as a starting point, with silk kept as the basis of the material holding the microneedles.

Silk is strong, doesn't cause a reaction in plants, and can be made degradable enough to get out of the way once the drugs have been delivered.

However, a lot also had to change compared to microneedles used on humans: plants have far less water available than the human body does, so the design had to be adapted.

The team of scientists was able to boost the silk's hydrophilicity (water-attracting capabilities), and come up with a new material more suited for plants.

"We found that adaptations of a material designed for drug delivery in humans to plants was not straightforward, due to differences not only in tissue vasculature, but also in fluid composition," says biologist Eugene Lim.

Tests of the material and its microneedled payload on tomato and tobacco plants showed that it could be successful as a drug delivery system. Fluorescent molecules were used to track the progress of the injection all the way from the roots to the leaves.

The system should adapt to other plants fairly easily, the researchers say, though scaling it up is going to prove more challenging. The work should prove useful for future projects though, both in delivering life-saving drugs to save plants from disease, and in engineering them to avoid disease in the first place.

"For the future, our research interests will go beyond antibiotic delivery to genetic engineering and point-of-care diagnostics based on metabolite sampling," says environmental engineer Benedetto Marelli.

The research has been published in Advanced Science.

Visit link:
Scientists Find New Way to Inject Plants With Medicine, And It May Help Save Our Crops - ScienceAlert

WITH food security trending across social media sites, its important to take note of the blue-sky research being carried out in Australia to future-proof our food.

While panic buying and poor logistics have caused the majority of food shortages on Australian supermarket shelves, long-term climate trends and the commercial realities of needing to 'grow more with less' have been driving researchers toward altering the way plants grow at a fundamental level.

Despite the long-winded name, the Australian National University's (ANU) Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Transitional Photosynthesis has a rather straightforward mission - research the ways photosynthesis can be altered to increase yield in food crops.

Centre director and ANU professor Robert Furbank said photosynthesis, the process green plants use to convert sunlight into chemical energy, could give farmers the tools to increase crop production while battling with changes to the climate.

"Australian plant scientists are punching above their weight by participating in global, interdisciplinary efforts to find ways to increase crop production," professor Furbank said.

"We essentially need to double the production of major cereals before 2050 to secure food availability for the rapidly growing world population."

Initial outcomes from the research were recently published in the Journal of Experimental Botany.

Co-editor and ANU researcher professor John Evans said the publications showed how improving photosynthesis could benefit food production.

"We are working on improving photosynthesis on different fronts, from finding crop varieties that need less water, to tweaking parts of the process in order to capture more carbon dioxide and sunlight," professor Evans said.

"We know that there is a delay of at least a decade to get these solutions to the breeders and farmers, so we need to start developing new opportunities now before we run out of options."

Professor Evans said the research covers everything from genetic engineering to synthetic biology, working across crops such as wheat, rice and sorghum.

While the pay-off from this sort of 'blue-sky' research can be decades away, professor Furbank said it was important the research was conducted now.

"It is similar to finding a virus vaccine to solve a pandemic, it doesn't happen overnight.

"We know that Australia's agriculture is going to be one area of the world that is most affected by climate extremes, so we are preparing to have a toolbox of plant innovations ready to ensure global food security in a decade or so."

Professor Furbank said this was why long-term proactive funding for blue-sky research was needed.

Read more:
Blue-sky thinking for food production - Farm Weekly

The statement by the pro-GMO expert in an article published in the Ethiopia Observer: [GMOs] in principle, [] could allow increased yield and lower production costs, which translates to increased farm income, lacks moral correctness and it is built more on theory than reality.

The author has every right to promote Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) but his article is one-sided, selective in its use of studies, and full of factual errors. The author who has a manifestly unbridled enthusiasm for GMOs makes some overconfident claims, starting from his opening line which says, genetically modified (GM) traits can be valuable and the discussion around them should be based on facts and in a case-by-case approach. However, he did not provide enough case-by-case examples of these traits that could be relevant to solve the problems of smallholder farmers in Ethiopia. After all, any technological intervention must be based on the needs and realities of those smallholder farmers who are the main producers of food and raw material for industrial production in Ethiopia. For instance, we have yet to see GM traits that could be effective to mitigate the devastating wheat rust, withstand extreme drought and frost, and provide a higher yield than existing crop varieties. There are numerous writings that wax lyrical about the virtues of GMOs, many of them written by paid advocates. But independent assessments on the nature and performance of GM crops in comparison with conventionally improved varieties are rare. Even if we must advocate for GMOs, it must be in consideration of the countrys interest than that of the multinationals, whose sole motive is nothing more than profit. We must also communicate facts that are relevant for smallholder farming in Ethiopia instead of stories from commercial farming in the U.S. or other industrialized countries. If the GM traits must be there, it must be with the aim to solve farmers problems.

Indeed, GMOs should not be confused with the use of biotechnology as a science. There are biotechnology tools such as marker-assisted selection that are cheaper and can be helpful in countries like Ethiopia to develop new varieties in a short period of time for use. These kinds of technologies are less risky and easy to integrate with conventional breeding in pro-poor public research institutions.

In the first paragraph, the author wrote, the genome of organisms can be altered to contain [a] genetic variants so that the GMO can express a desired trait, which could, for instance, be drought-tolerance. He adds, in principle, this could allow increased yield and lower production costs, which translates to increased farm income. The truth of the matter is, we have not yet seen super varieties or GM cultivars that have led to a huge surge in yields and tolerate moisture stress. High yield already exists in conventionally breed improved varieties. Most GMOs are created by inserting genes (e.g. from bacteria) into these high yielding varieties to produce toxins that kill insects or to become herbicide tolerant. Thus, two types of GM crops dominate todays market.

Insect-resistant GM crops these types of GM crops are developed by introducing a gene fromBacillus thuringiensis(Bt), a soil bacterium. Such GM plants or Bt-plants were created to produce toxins that kill insect pests. The advantage is that we avoid spraying synthetic chemicals to control insect-pest by growing Bt-crops. This is useful for the environment and the economy of the producer. But things get murkier when the insect evolves through time and develop resistance to Bt toxin produced by the plants. Insect resistance by GM crops breaks as much as those varieties developed through conventional breeding. Studies have already shown this problem. This would force farmers to go back to using chemicals to control the pest, making the cost of production higher as farmers would be obliged to buy expensive GM seeds as well as associated insecticidal chemicals. It also means farmers would be required to spray more chemicals, which is bad for the environment. Another problem with GM crops is that they do not have certain features compared to their counterpart conventional varieties while they maintain insect resistance. For instance, the Bt-cotton failed in Burkina Faso because the fiber quality of cotton was below standard, and farmers were forced to sell at a low price. Generally, GM crops have not demonstrated superior performance compared to conventional varieties in this regard but one thing that we could speak with certitude is they increase production costs. This is because all GMOs are patented, which makes the seeds and associated agrochemical inputs more expensive. Thus, the patent on such GM crops is an incentive for the multinationals to accumulate wealth at the expense of poor farmers.

Herbicide-tolerant GM crops these types of GM crops are modified to tolerate huge doses of chemical herbicide e.g. Roundup Ready GM soybeans. Roundup kills non-modified normal soya plants and weeds. In other words, normal soya plants and all other unwanted plants in the field (weeds) die except those GM soya plants when we spray them with Roundup. Indeed, this makes weed control easier or manageable when we have a huge soya field which otherwise is difficult to control weeds by manual weeding. This can be beneficial for large scale farmers in developed countries where labor is expensive. The problem with this type of GM crop is the emergence of superweeds as observed in recent years. These are tolerant weeds that are no longer killed by Roundup and growers must spray more of it to control weed infestation. This means it exacerbates the environmental hazard. It increases water, soil, and air pollution, which can have a devastating effect on human and ecosystem health. Still, the winners are companies who earn from the sale of a patented chemical (roundup) and GM soya seeds.

Companies are now grabbing plant genetic resources by incorporating genes from traditional plant varieties and wild relatives into GM crops through patenting.

The author correctly points out that altering the genomes of plants and animals did not begin with the emergence of genetic engineering (GE) and genetic modification in recent decades. In fact, people have been altering the genomes of plants and animals for thousands of years starting from domestication through to traditional selection and modern-day breeding, he wrote. This is why many observers find patenting plants and animals outrageous because the diversity of crops that we have today is the result of thousands of years of selection and management by farmers. Companies are now grabbing plant genetic resources by incorporating genes from traditional plant varieties and crop wild relatives into GM crops through patenting It must be underlined that companies are not inventing genes, but they are simply isolating them from farmers varieties or genetic resources in the public domain. They would go on introducing these genes to a new one to claim a patent, which gives them complete monopoly of the genes. The example of introducing a gene that confers resistance to Xanthomonas from sweet pepper to banana shows this technological practice. The same thing is being tried on Enset. This becomes unfair when the technology is monopolized by a handful of multinational companies through patents.

In my view, it is insincere to promote GMOs in a country that has weak or insufficient biosafety regulatory frameworks such as biotechnology and/or biosafety policy, laws, regulations and guidelines, administrative systems, decision-making systems and mechanisms for public engagement.

In addition to hiding these socio-economic harms from use of GMOs, the author intentionally avoids distinguishing genetic engineering from conventional breeding including the selection of better plant varieties by farmers. Genetic engineering (that involves the transfer of genes from unrelated organism to another such as between bacteria and plants to create transgenic organisms), and Genetic modification (that involves modifying the DNA of an organism by removing, replacing some genes or inserting genes from other plants of the same species) is different from farmers selection practices (conscious or unconscious). The later resulted in an enormous diversity of crops and animals we have today. This is a common communication practice by pro-GMO experts to ignore the socio-economic and ecological risks of GMOs. In my view, it is insincere to promote GMOs in a country that has weak or insufficient biosafety regulatory frameworks such as biotechnology and/or biosafety policy, laws, regulations and guidelines, administrative systems, decision-making systems and mechanisms for public engagement. While the authors doubt about Ethiopias eco-leadership is forgivable, the fact he stressed regarding earlier cultivation of GMOs in other African countries is undeniable.

I leave it to the author to learn about Ethiopias Pan-African environmental initiative by reading Dr. Melaku Woreds work and that of Dr. Tewolde Berhan Gebre Egziabher. Earlier cultivation of GMOs in other African countries is true, as the author points out. But he avoids mentioning that the use of GMOs has been restricted to few crops and countries on the continent. The U.S. and its agri-conglomerates pushed for commercial cultivation of GM crops in South Africa in the late 1990s following the countrys transition to democracy from apartheid. It is no accident, that they are trying to push for the same market opportunity in Ethiopia today. They see a similar moment in the countrys history a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. In the last 20 years, big commercial farmers in South Africa have been growing GMOs. Egypt and Sudan have allowed GM crop cultivation, especially Bt-Cotton. Burkina Faso tried to do the same, but it largely failed. Overall, GMOs have not expanded to many African countries as hoped by the U.S and its companies in the 1990s and later years. Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda seem to be the new target countries now. Uganda has allowed trials for the genetically modified banana in the last few years. Rwanda is considering opening up to genetically modified potato. GMOs have also made their way to the African Union in the form of policy through the development of the African Seed and Biotechnology Programme in 2008. But the program focuses on overall seed system development and states that GMOs can be one alternative, but it should be managed safely. I would also like to remind the author that this program was developed based on the African Model law that Ethiopia drafted in 2000, before its relaxation due to pressure from western donors and new philanthropists such as Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. It is understandable for the author to say that GM can be a valuable tool but is no cure-all when he argues using a study done by people from Agri-food group and a study that uses data from the internet (a literature review of studies mostly done/financed by Monsanto and other companies) instead of filed level environmental and socio-economic impacts of GMOs to make conclusions. What we have been lacking is an independent study of GMOs that has no affiliation to pro- and ant-GMO movements. So, all these praises dont support the authors claims.

The author also tells that for countries with foreign currency bottlenecks like Ethiopia, reduced use of inputs such as pesticide, insecticide, and herbicide could translate to substantial foreign currency savings. Unfortunately, this is premised on flawed reasoning. Ethiopia could earn more foreign currency from exporting its organic products. Buying a technology that others benefit from will not solve its currency problem. Rather Ethiopias export will be questioned after the adoption of GMOs especially in Europe where GMOs are not welcomed both by consumers and their strict regulatory framework.

Another argument by the author is the labor-saving benefits of insect-resistant and herbicide-tolerant maize varieties. This is beside the point. It is strange to argue in this manner in a country where millions of young people are not in employment. The country might have many other problems but not labor. The author also said, GM also offers an adaptive capacity against an increasingly unpredictable future. What is proof of this? Of course, there is not. The author has simply overstretched himself. In my view, there is no risk that vulnerable smallholder farmers can bear, and Pro-GMO experts need to be honest and build public trust in Ethiopia

Image: Cotton farmers near Arba Minch, southern Ethiopia, photo Ecotextile.

This article is published under aCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. Please cite Ethiopia Observer prominently and link clearly to the original article if you republish. If you have any queries, please contact us at ethiopiaobserver@protonmail.com. Check individual images for licensing details.

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We need more honesty in GMO discussions - Ethiopia Observer

Why are the origins of the pandemic so controversial?

How Covid-19 began has become increasingly contentious, with the US and other allies suggesting China has not been transparent about the origins of the outbreak.

Donald Trump, the US president, has given credence to the idea that intelligence exists suggesting the virus may have escaped from a lab in Wuhan, although the US intelligence community has pointedly declined to back this up. The scientific community says there is no current evidence for this claim.

This follows reports that the White House had been pressuring US intelligence community on the claim, recalling the Bush administrations pressure to stove pipe the intelligence before the war in Iraq.

A specific issue is that the official origin story doesnt add up in terms of the initial epidemiology of the outbreak, not least the incidence of early cases with no apparent connection to the Wuhan seafood market, where Beijing says the outbreak began. If these people were not infected at the market, or via contacts who were infected at the market, critics ask, how do you explain these cases?

Two laboratories in Wuhan studying bat coronaviruses have come under the spotlight. The Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) is a biosecurity level 4 facility the highest for biocontainment and the level 2 Wuhan Centre for Disease Control, which is located not far from the fish market, had collected bat coronavirus specimens.

Several theories have been promoted. The first, and wildest, is that scientists at WIV were engaged in experiments with bat coronavirus, involving so-called gene splicing, and the virus then escaped and infected humans. A second version is that sloppy biosecurity among lab staff and in procedures, perhaps in the collection or disposal of animal specimens, released a wild virus.

The scientific consensus rejecting the virus being engineered is almost unanimous. In a letter to Nature in March, a team in California led by microbiology professor Kristian Andersen said the genetic data irrefutably shows that [Covid-19] is not derived from any previously used virus backbone in other words spliced sections of another known virus.

Far more likely, they suggested, was that the virus emerged naturally and became stronger through natural selection. We propose two scenarios that can plausibly explain the origin of Sars-CoV-2: natural selection in an animal host before zoonotic [animal to human] transfer; and natural selection in humans following zoonotic transfer.

Peter Ben Embarek, an expert at the World Health Organization in animal to human transmission of diseases, and other specialists also explained to the Guardian that if there had been any manipulation of the virus you would expect to see evidence in both the gene sequences and also distortion in the data of the family tree of mutations a so-called reticulation effect.

In a statement to the Guardian, James Le Duc, the head of the Galveston National Laboratory in the US, the biggest active biocontainment facility on a US academic campus, also poured cold water on the suggestion.

There is convincing evidence that the new virus was not the result of intentional genetic engineering and that it almost certainly originated from nature, given its high similarity to other known bat-associated coronaviruses, he said.

The accidental release of a wild sample has been the focus of most attention, although the evidence offered is at best highly circumstantial.

The Washington Post has reported concerns in 2018 over security and management weakness from US embassy officials who visited the WIV several times, although the paper also conceded there was no conclusive proof the lab was the source of the outbreak.

Le Duc, however, paints a different picture of the WIV. I have visited and toured the new BSL4 laboratory in Wuhan, prior to it starting operations in 2017- It is of comparable quality and safety measures as any currently in operation in the US or Europe.

He also described encounters with Shi Zhengli, the Chinese virologist at the WIV who has led research into bat coronaviruses, and discovered the link between bats and the Sars virus that caused disease worldwide in 2003, describing her as fully engaged, very open and transparent about her work, and eager to collaborate.

Maureen Miller, an epidemiologist who worked with Shi as part of a US-funded viral research programme, echoed Le Ducs assessment. She said she believed the lab escape theory was an absolute conspiracy theory and referred to Shi as brilliant.

While the experts who spoke to the Guardian made clear that understanding of the origins of the virus remained provisional, they added that the current state of knowledge of the initial spread also created problems for the lab escape theory.

When Peter Forster, a geneticist at Cambridge, compared sequences of the virus genome collected early in the Chines outbreak and later globally he identified three dominant strains.

Early in the outbreak, two strains appear to have been in circulation at roughly at the same time strain A and strain B with a C variant later developing from strain B.

But in a surprise finding, the version with the closest genetic similarity to bat coronavirus was not the one most prevalent early on in the central Chinese city of Wuhan but instead associated with a scattering of early cases in the southern Guangdong province.

Between 24 December 2019 and 17 January 2020, Forster explains, just three out of 23 cases in Wuhan were type A, while the rest were type B. In patients in Guangdong province, however, five out of nine were found to have type A of the virus.

The very small numbers notwithstanding, said Forster, the early genome frequencies until 17 January do not favour Wuhan as an origin over other parts of China, for example five of nine Guangdong/Shenzhen patients who had A types.

In other words, it still remains far from certain that Wuhan was even necessarily where the virus first emerged.

The pandemic has exacerbated existing geopolitical struggles, prompting a disinformation war that has drawn in the US, China, Russia and others.

Journalists and scientists have been targeted by people with an apparent interest in pushing circumstantial evidence related to the viruss origins, perhaps as part of this campaign and to distract from the fact that few governments have had a fault-free response.

The current state of knowledge about coronavirus and its origin suggest the most likely explanation remains the most prosaic. Like other coronaviruses before, it simply spread to humans via a natural event, the starting point for many in the scientific community including the World Health Organization.

Further testing in China in the months ahead may eventually establish the source of the outbreak. But for now it is too early.

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Where did Covid-19 come from? What we know about its origins - The Guardian

Apr 29th 2020

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AURIC GOLDFINGER, villain of the novel which bears his name, quotes a vivid Chicago aphorism to James Bond: Once is happenstance, twice is coincidence, the third time its enemy action.

Until 2002 medical science knew of a handful of coronaviruses that infected human beings, none of which caused serious illness. Then, in 2002, a virus now called SARS-CoV surfaced in the Chinese province of Guangdong. The subsequent outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) killed 774 people around the world before it was brought under control. In 2012 another new illness, Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome (MERS), heralded the arrival of MERS-CoV, which while not spreading as far and as wide as SARS (bar an excursion to South Korea) has not yet been eliminated. It has killed 858 people to date, the most recent of them on February 4th.

The third time, it was SARS-CoV-2, now responsible for 225,000 covid-19 deaths. Both SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV are closely related to coronaviruses found in wild bats. In the case of SARS-CoV, the accepted story is that the virus spread from bats in a cave in Yunnan province into civets, which were sold at markets in Guangdong. In the case of MERS-CoV, the virus spread from bats into camels. It now passes regularly from camels to humans, which makes it hard to eliminate, but only spreads between people in conditions of close proximity, which makes it manageable.

Third time unluckyAn origin among bats seems overwhelmingly likely for SARS-CoV-2, too. The route it took from bat to human, though, has yet to be identified. If, like MERS-CoV, the virus is still circulating in an animal reservoir, it could break out again in the future. If not, some other virus will surely try something similar. Peter Ben Embarek, an expert on zoonoses (diseases passed from animals to people) at the World Health Organisation, says that such spillovers are becoming more common as humans and their farmed animals push into new areas where they have closer contact with wildlife. Understanding the detail of how such spillovers occur should provide insights into stopping them.

In some minds, though, the possibility looms of enemy action on the part of something larger than a virus. Since the advent of genetic engineering in the 1970s, conspiracy theorists have pointed to pretty much every new infectious disease, from AIDS to Ebola to MERS to Lyme disease to SARS to Zika, as being a result of human tinkering or malevolence.

The politics of the covid-19 pandemic mean that this time such theories have an even greater appeal than normal. The pandemic started in China, where the governments ingrained urge to cover problems up led it to delay measures that might have curtailed its spread. It has claimed its greatest toll in America, where the recorded number of covid-19 deaths already outstrips the number of names on the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, DC.

These facts would have led to accusations ringing out across the Pacific come what may. What makes things worse is a suspicion in some quarters that SARS-CoV-2 might in some way be connected to Chinese virological research, and that saying so may reapportion any blame.

There is no evidence for the claim. Western experts say categorically that the sequence of the new viruss genomewhich Chinese scientists published early on, openly and accuratelyreveals none of the telltales genetic engineering would leave in its wake. But it remains a fact that in Wuhan, where the outbreak was first spotted, there is a laboratory where scientists have in the past deliberately made coronaviruses more pathogenic.

Such research is carried out in laboratories around the world. Its proponents see it as a vital way of studying the question that covid-19 has brought so cruelly into the spotlight: how does a virus become the sort of thing that starts a pandemic? That some of this research has been done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) seems all but certainly a coincidence. Without a compelling alternative account of the diseases origin, however, there is room for doubt to remain.

The 4% differenceThe origin of the virus behind the 2003 SARS outbreakclassic SARS, as some virologists now wryly call itwas established in large part by Shi Zhengli, a researcher at WIV sometimes referred to in Chinese media as the bat lady. Over a period of years she and her team visited remote locations all across the country in search of a close relative of SARS-CoV in bats or their guano. They found one in a cave full of horseshoe bats in Yunnan.

It is in the collection of viral genomes assembled during those studies that scientists have now found the bat virus closest to SARS-CoV-2. A strain called RaTG13 gathered in the same cave in Yunnan shares 96% of its genetic sequence with the new virus. RaTG13 is not that viruss ancestor. It is something more like its cousin. Edward Holmes, a virologist at the University of Sydney, estimates that the 4% difference between the two represents at least 20 years of evolutionary divergence from some common antecedent, and probably something more like 50.

Although bats could, in theory, have passed a virus descended from that antecedent directly to humans, experts find the idea unlikely. The bat viruses look different from SARS-CoV-2 in a specific way. In SARS-CoV-2 the spike protein on the viral particles surface has a receptor-binding domain (RBD) that is adept at sticking to a particular molecule on the surface of the human cells the virus infects. The RBD in bat coronaviruses is not the same.

One recent study suggests that SARS-CoV-2 is the product of natural genomic recombination. Different coronaviruses infecting the same host are more than happy to swap bits of genome. If a bat virus similar to RaTG13 got into an animal already infected with a coronavirus which boasted an RBD better suited to infecting humans, a basically batty virus with a more human-attuned RBD might well arise. That is what SARS-CoV-2 looks like.

Early on, it was widely imagined that the intermediate host was likely to be a species sold in Wuhans Huanan Seafood and Wildlife Market, a place where all sorts of creatures, from raccoon dogs to ferret badgers, and from near and far, are crammed together in unsanitary conditions. Many early human cases of covid-19 were associated with this market. Jonathan Epstein, vice-president of science with EcoHealth Alliance, an NGO, says of 585 swabs of different surfaces around the market, about 33 were positive for SARS-CoV-2. They all came from the area known to sell wild animals. That is pretty much as strong as circumstantial evidence gets.

The first animal to come under serious suspicion was the pangolin. A coronavirus found in pangolins has an RBD essentially identical to that of SARS-CoV-2, suggesting that it might have been the virus with which the bat virus recombined on its way to becoming SARS-CoV-2. Pangolins are used in traditional medicine, and though they are endangered, they can nonetheless be found on menus. There are apparently no records of them being traded at the Huanan market. But given that such trading is illegal, and that such records would now look rather incriminating, this is hardly proof that they were not.

The fact that pangolins are known to harbour viruses from which SARS-CoV-2 could have picked up its human-compatible RBD is certainly suggestive. But a range of other animals might harbour such viruses, too; its just that scientists have not yet looked all that thoroughly. The RBD in SARS-CoV-2 is useful not only for attacking the cells of human beings and, presumably, pangolins. It provides access to similar cells in other species, too. In recent weeks SARS-CoV-2 has been shown to have found its way from humans into domestic cats, farmed mink and a tiger. There is some evidence that it can actually pass between cats, which makes it conceivable that they were the intermediatethough there is as yet no evidence of a cat infecting a human.

The markets appeal as a site for the human infections behind the Wuhan outbreak remains strong; a market in Guangdong is blamed for the spread of SARS. Without a known intermediate, though, the evidence against it remains circumstantial. Though many early human cases were associated with the market, plenty were not. They may have been linked to people with ties to the market in ways not yet known. But one cannot be sure.

Where to begin?The viral genomes found in early patients are so similar as to suggest strongly that the virus jumped from its intermediate host to people only once. Estimates based on the rate at which genomes diverge give the earliest time for this transfer as early October 2019. If that is right there were almost certainly infections which were not serious, or which did not reach hospitals, or which were not recognised as odd, before the first official cases were seen in Wuhan at the beginning of December. Those early cases may have taken place elsewhere.

Ian Lipkin, the boss of the Centre for Infection and Immunity at Columbia University, in New York, is working with Chinese researchers to test blood samples taken late last year from patients with pneumonia all around China, to see if there is any evidence for the virus having spread to Wuhan from somewhere else. If there is, then it may have entered Huanan market not in a cage, but on two legs. The market is popular with visitors as well as locals, and is close to Hankou railway station, a hub in Chinas high-speed rail network.

Further research may make when, where and how the virus got into people clearer. There is scope for a lot more virus hunting in a wider range of possible intermediate species. If it were possible to conduct detailed interviews with those who came down with the earliest cases of covid-19, that genetic sampling could be better aimed, says Dr Embarek, and with a bit of luck one might get to the source. But the time needed to do this, he adds, might be quick, or it might be extremely long.

If it turns out to have originated elsewhere, the new viruss identification during the early stages of the Wuhan epidemic may turn out to be thanks to the citys concentration of virological know-howknow-how that is now surely being thrown into sequencing more viruses from more sources. But until a satisfactory account of a natural spillover is achieved, that same concentration of know-how, at WIV and another local research centre, the Wuhan Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, will continue to attract suspicion.

In 2017 WIV opened the first biosecurity-level 4 (BSL-4) laboratory in Chinathe sort of high-containment facility in which work is done on the most dangerous pathogens. A large part of Dr Shis post-SARS research there has been aimed at understanding the potential which viruses still circulating among bats have to spill over into the human population. In one experiment she and Ge Xingyi, also of the WIV, in collaboration with American and Italian scientists, explored the disease-like potential of a bat coronavirus, SHC014-CoV, by recombining its genome with that of a mouse-infecting coronavirus. The WIV newsletter of November 2015 reported that the resulting virus could replicate efficiently in primary human airway cells and achieve in vitro titres equivalent to epidemic strains of SARS-CoV. In early April this newsletter and all others were removed from the institutes website.

This work, results from which were also published in Nature Medicine, demonstrated that SARS-CoVs jump from bats to humans had not been a fluke; other bat coronaviruses were capable of something similar. Useful to know. But giving pathogens and potential pathogens extra powers in order to understand what they may be capable of is a controversial undertaking. These gain of function experiments, their proponents insist, have important uses such as understanding drug resistance and the tricks viruses employ to evade the immune system. They also carry obvious risks: the techniques on which they depend could be abused; their products could leak. The creation of an enhanced strain of bird flu in 2011 in an attempt to understand the peculiar virulence of the flu strain responsible for the pandemic of 1918-19 caused widespread alarm. America stopped funding gain-of-function work for several years.

Filippa Lentzos, who studies biomedicine and security at Kings College, London, says the possibility of SARS-CoV-2 having an origin connected with legitimate research is being discussed widely in the world of biosecurity. The possibilities speculated about include a leak of material from a laboratory and also the accidental infection of a human being in the course of work either in a lab or in the field.

Leaks from laboratories, including BSL-4 labs, are not unheard of. The worlds last known case of smallpox was caused by a leak from a British laboratory in 1978. An outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2007 had a similar origin. In America there have been accidental releases and mishandlings involving Ebola, and, from a lower-containment-level laboratory, a deadly strain of bird flu. In China laboratory workers seem to have been infected with SARS and transmitted it to contacts outside on at least two occasions.

Heres one I made earlierThings doubtless leak out of labs working at lower biosafety levels, too. But how much they do so is unknown, in part because people worry about them less. And as in other parts of this story the unknown is a Petri dish in which speculation can grow. This may be part of the reason for interest in a lab at the Wuhan Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. A preprint published on ResearchGate, a website, by two Chinese scientists and subsequently removed suggested that work done there may have been cause for concern. This lab is reported to have housed animalsincluding, for one study, hundreds of bats from Hubei and Zhejiang provincesand to have specialised in pathogen collection.

Richard Pilch, who works on chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, in California, says that there is one feature of the new virus which might conceivably have arisen during passaging experiments in which pathogens are passed between hosts so as to study the evolution of their ability to spread. This is the polybasic cleavage site, which might enhance infectivity. SARS-CoV-2 has such a site on its spike protein. Its closest relatives among bat coronaviruses do not. But though such a cleavage site could have arisen through passaging there is no evidence that, in this case, it did. It could also have evolved in the normal way as the virus passed from host to host. Dr Holmes, meanwhile, has said that there is no evidence that SARS-CoV-2...originated in a laboratory in Wuhan, China. Though others have speculated about coincidences and possibilities, no one has been able, as yet, to undermine that statement.

Many scientists think that with so many biologists actively hunting for bat viruses, and gain-of-function work becoming more common, the world is at increasing risk of a laboratory-derived pandemic at some point. One of my biggest hopes out of this pandemic is that we address this issueit really worries me, says Dr Pilch. Today there are around 70 BSL-4 sites in 30 countries. More such facilities are planned.

Again, though, it is necessary to consider the unknown. Every year there are tens of thousands of fatal cases of respiratory disease around the world of which the cause is mysterious. Some of them may be the result of unrecognised zoonoses. The question of whether they really are, and how those threats may stack up, needs attention. That attention needs laboratories. It also needs a degree of open co-operation that America is now degrading with accusations and reductions in funding, and that China has taken steps to suppress at source. That suppression has done nothing to help the country; indeed, by supporting speculation, it may yet harm it.

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The pieces of the puzzle of covid-19s origin are coming to light - The Economist

In the fall of 2011, Dr. Ron Fouchier developed one of the most dangerous viruses you can make. Fouchier, a Dutch virologist at the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, claimed that his team had done something really, really stupid and mutated the hell out of H5N1.At nearly the same time, Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin-Madison worked on grafting the H5N1 spike gene onto 2009 H1N1 swine flu, creating another transmissible, virulent strain.

Despite only 600 human cases of the H5N1 (bird flu) virus in the previous two decades, the exceptionally high mortality rate greater than 50 percent pushed the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to block the publication of both teams research. After a heated debate in the scientific community, the World Health Organization deemed it safe to publish the findings. While Kawaokas paper appeared in the journal Nature, Fouchiers original study appeared in Science. Although both teams generated viruses that were not as lethal as their wild forms, critics worried that the papers would enable rogue scientists to replicate the manipulations and weaponize a more contagious virus.

While some arms control experts like Graham Allison believe that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon, others have dismissed bioweapons due to dissemination issues, exemplified in failed biological attacks with botulinum toxin and anthrax by the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo. Furthermore, studies from the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment indicated that bioweapons could cause tens of thousands of deaths under ideal environmental conditions but would not severely undermine critical infrastructure. In 2012, Dr. Anthony Fauci, the longtime director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, argued that the benefits in vaccine advancement from Fouchiers research outweighed the risks of nefarious use.

Today, however, Fauci is at the helm of Americas response to a global pandemic. Although the world has never experienced a mass-casualty bioweapons incident, COVID-19 has caused sustained, strategic-level harm. In the absence of a vaccine, it has killed more than 60,000 Americans and forced over 30 million Americans into unemployment. The isolation of large segments of society has crippled the economy and traditional sources of American power: domestically, cascading, second- and third-order effects plague critical national infrastructure; and internationally, power projection wanes, epitomized by the U.S. Navys sidelining of the USS Theodore Roosevelt.

While the SARS-CoV-2 virus that causes COVID-19 is not a bioweapon, technological advances increase the possibility of a future bioweapon wreaking similar strategic havoc. Specifically, advancements in genetic engineering and delivery mechanisms may lead to the more lethal microorganisms and toxins and, consequently, the most dangerous pandemic yet. Therefore, the United States should develop a new strategy to deter and disrupt biological threats to the nation.

Engineering the Next Pandemic

Although a bioweapon-induced pandemic seems unlikely in the short term, preparedness for future attacks begins with understanding the possible threat. According to the Centers for Disease Control, bioweapons are intentionally released microorganisms bacteria, viruses, fungi or toxins, coupled with a delivery system, that cause disease or death in people, animals, or plants. In contrast to other chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, they have distinctive dangerous characteristics: miniscule quantities even 10-8 milligrams per person can be lethal; the symptoms can have a delayed onset; and ensuing waves of infection can manifest beyond the original attack site. The Centers for Disease Control grouped over 30 weaponizable microorganisms and toxins into three threat categories based on lethality, transmissibility, and necessity for special public heath interventions. While Categories A and B cover existing high and moderate threats, respectively, Category C focuses on emerging pathogens, like the Nipah virus and hantavirus, that could be engineered for mass dissemination. Historically, though, bioweapons were relatively unsophisticated and inexpensive when compared to chemical and nuclear production chains, which explains their protracted use.

One of the earliest examples of biological warfare occurred over 2,000 years ago, when Assyrians infected enemy wells with rye ergot fungus. In 1763, the British army presented smallpox-infested blankets to Native American during the Siege of Fort Pitt. During World War II, the Japanese army poisoned over 1,000 water wells in Chinese villages to study typhus and cholera outbreaks. In 1984, the Rajneeshee cult contaminated salad bars in Oregon restaurants with Salmonella typhimurium, causing 751 cases of enteritis. Most recently, Bacillus anthracis spores sent in the U.S. postal system induced 22 cases of anthrax and five deaths in 2001, and three U.S. Senate office buildings shut down in February 2004 after the discovery of ricin in a mailroom.

Despite this history of usage, the challenge of disseminating the biological agent has, thus far, meant that bioweapons attacks have not produced high casualties. Bioweapons can be delivered in numerous ways: direct absorption or injection into the skin, inhalation of aerosol sprays, or via consumption of food and water. The most vulnerable and often most lethal point of entry is the lungs, but particles must fall within a restrictive size range of 1 micrometer to 5 micrometers to penetrate them. Fortunately, most biological agents break down quickly in the environment through exposure to heat, oxidation, and pollution, coupled with the roughly 50 percent loss of the microorganism during aerosol dissemination or 90 percent loss during explosive dissemination.

The revolution in genetic engineering provides a path for overcoming delivery issues and escalating a biological attack into a pandemic. First, tools for analyzing and altering a microorganisms DNA or RNA are available and affordable worldwide. The introduction of clustered regularly interspersed short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) a technique that acts like scissors or a pencil to alter DNA sequences and gene functions in 2013 made biodefense more challenging. Even as experienced researchers struggle to control clustered regularly interspersed short palindromic repeats and prevent unintended effects, malevolent actors with newfound access can attempt to manipulate existing agents to increase contagiousness; improve resistance to antibiotics, vaccines, and anti-virals; enhance survivability in the environment; and develop means of mass production. Infamously, Australian researchers in 2001 endeavored to induce infertility in mice by inserting the interleukin-4 gene into the mousepox virus. Instead, they inadvertently altered the virus to become more virulent and kill previously vaccinated mice, insinuating that the same could be done with smallpox for humans.

Moving one step further, genetic engineering raises the possibility of creating completely new biological weapons from scratch via methods similar to the test-tube synthesis of poliovirus in 2002. It is, thankfully, hard to use this process to create agents that can kill humans. However, genetic engineering can be used to create non-lethal weapons that, when coupled with longer-range delivery devices, could kill crops and animals, and destroy materials fuel, plastic, rubber, stealth paints, and constructional supplies that are critical to the economy.

Skeptics might question why a rational adversary would risk creating and employing bioweapons that are unpredictable and relatively hard to deliver to a target. First, some potential terrorists are irrational in the sense that death does not deter their service to a higher purpose; or, they may simply show a willingness to carry out orders from a state sponsor or a lack of concern for public opinion. Second, future state aggressors might genetically engineer a vaccine to immunize their populations prior to unleashing a bioweapon so that the attack would only be indiscriminate within targeted nations. Third, the unprecedented harm done by COVID-19 demands a transformation of 9/11-era priorities to recognize that preparing for domestic threats like pandemics will be far greater concerns for most Americans than threats from foreign adversaries. Bioweapons combine the worst of these national and international threats.

Ultimately, for a bioweapon attack to turn into a pandemic like the SARS-CoV-2 virus, three initial conditions must be met: first, the microorganism or toxin must not have an effective remedy available; second, it must be easily transmittable; and third, it must be fatal for some victims. Whereas a number of natural-born microbes satisfied these conditions in the past, it is possible for a genetically engineered bioweapon to have the same strategic impact in the future.

Prepare for the Worst

John Barrys The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History provides insight into what the world might look like in the approaching age of biological attacks. It portrays how researchers failed to counter the 1918 flu strain while it spread to one-third of the global population. With a mortality rate of approximately 20 percent, the Spanish flus viral mutations proved especially fatal for military members with strong immune systems. Young people with previous exposure to milder flu strains likely suffered from immunological memory, which prompted a dysregulated immune response to the 1918 strain. At the time of the books publication in 2004, President George W. Bush took notice.

In a November 2005 speech at the National Institutes of Health, with Fauci notably in attendance, Bush warned, If we wait for a pandemic to appear, it will be too late to prepare. And one day many lives could be needlessly lost because we failed to act today. Similarly, the government should prepare now to respond to a future bioweapon attack whether from terrorism or interstate warfare. This preparation ought to proceed along three categories of action: deterrence, disruption, and defense.

Deterrence

In the realm of biological warfare, the most effective way to save lives is to persuade an adversary that an attack will not succeed. Specifically, deterrence by denial makes the act of aggression unprofitable by rendering the target harder to take, harder to keep, or both. To this end, the United States can harden its biowarfare response by increasing interagency cooperation, wargaming the resulting plans, and compiling the materials required for their execution.

The Department of Defense the largest agency in the U.S. government is the logical choice to organize a whole-of-government approach to countering bioweapons. Last November, the Pentagon released the Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction doctrine, which outlined how the military will synchronize its response with governmental stakeholders like the Director of National Intelligence, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Health and Human Services. Partnerships, however, should expand beyond governmental agencies via a military joint task force with leadership from the medical community and information technology professionals. The Department of Homeland Security and Centers for Disease Control should coordinate with medical schools to incorporate more curriculum and periodic exercises on pandemic control and emergency response. Likewise, the Pentagon should develop best practices for establishing communications, sustaining services, and combatting disinformation during a pandemic.

While increased interagency cooperation will encourage more robust pandemic plans, wargaming is key to testing how such plans fare in a biowarfare crisis. Last September, the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, ran a two-day wargame called Urban Outbreak 2019, in which 50 experts combatted a notional pandemic. Even though this scenario had a vaccine available from the start, the findings offer prescient insight into actions surrounding COVID-19 particularly that experienced leaders may display significant resistance when encountering first-time situations or prevent troops from interfacing with infected populations. Military and agency leaders should use wargames with worst-case, extraordinary bioweapons to recognize and overcome inherent biases while simultaneously brainstorming how to lower infection rates, implement quarantines, and communicate best practices to the public.

Wargaming should also help planners identify which materials require stockpiling ahead of the next pandemic. COVID-19, for example, exposed shortages of durable protective masks, hand sanitizer, antiseptic wipes, and surface cleaners. The 300,000 businesses that make up the defense industrial base should prepare for the research, production, and delivery of personal protective equipment whenever shortages arise. They should also expect to be tapped for antibiotic, vaccine, or anti-viral production, depending on the nature of the bioweapon.

Disruption

A pandemic is a lot like a forest fire, Bush said in his 2005 speech. If caught early it might be extinguished with limited damage. If deterrence fails, American policy should focus on the early detection and disruption of bioweapons. To achieve this goal, the United States can advocate for increased verification measures and high-performing information operations.

Although the Biological Weapons Convention went into force in 1975 and has 182 state parties, the treaty lacks verification procedures and merely prohibits the production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological agents for warfare purposes. Since the treaty permits defensive research, a major challenge is the dual-use nature of production chains, wherein the technology for allowable projects also supports harmful weapons. Given the complex and sensitive nature of vital biological research, the United States has chosen not to support the establishment of a verification agency for routine facility inspections. This choice stands in contrast to the American approach toward the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency, both of which have robust verification mechanisms. Without this accountability, however, the Soviet Union established the Biopreparat after signing the Biological Weapons Convention treaty, employing over 50,000 people to produce tons of anthrax bacilli, smallpox virus, and multidrug-resistant plague bacteria.

To assist with the early warning of bioweapon threats, the United States should improve its understanding of international biological facilities. For instance, International Gene Synthesis Consortium members use automated software and a common protocol to screen their customers, as well as synthetic gene orders with dangerous sequences from the Regulated Pathogen Database. Particular attention should be paid to biosafety level-4 and biosafety level-3 labs around the world, where human error has led to the unintentional escape of pathogens. The U.K. foot and mouth outbreak of 2007 was traced to a faulty waste disposal system at Pirbright Laboratory in Surrey. Additionally, SARS laboratory accidents occurred in China in 2004. Increasing the priority given to intelligence gathering and analysis related to bioweapons would be an important step in the right direction.

Defense

If the United States is unable to deter or disrupt a bioweapons attack, it should be prepared to execute a strong defense against it. First and foremost, the military ought to maintain the health of its servicemembers through a COVID-19-inspired operational plan for screening and quarantine. This plan would facilitate prompt and sustained emergency responses and combat operations, including key missions like strategic nuclear deterrent patrols. Domestically, the military will need to assist in civil support, law enforcement, border patrol, and the defense of critical infrastructure. Internationally, the Defense Department will serve as a logistics powerhouse.

At home, the armed forces have the manpower and experience to aid in a variety of national security sectors. In addition to the deployment of U.S. Navy hospital ships to New York City and Los Angeles during COVID-19, the National Guard has conducted drive-through testing, delivered water to vulnerable populations, and carried out state governors law enforcement orders for curfews and quarantines. For critical national infrastructure, the military will serve as first responders to newfound issues with electrical generation, water purification, sanitation, and information technology.

Abroad, the military could benefit from military-to-military planning and exercises with what former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Adm. (ret.) James Stavridis calls the equivalent of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization against pandemics. In the absence of this organization, the Air Force can coordinate logistics efforts to move overseas medical supplies to the United States and bring Americans home.

The United States should draw lessons learned from past international pandemic responses. The cholera outbreak among half a million Haitians following a 2010 earthquake demonstrated that the American military could work with international military counterparts to regenerate critical infrastructure in other countries. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 extended that cooperation to nongovernmental organizations like the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and Project Hope.

Successful military cooperation abroad will fulfill basic international needs and build trust for peaceful scientific cooperation, shifting the focus to future questions like whether the bioweapon is mutating, how environmental factors affect its spread, if infected people develop short- or long-term immunity, and which mitigation efforts are effective. Successful in-situ defense will fill interdisciplinary gaps in deterrence and disruption while a layered 3D approach will determine how well the world fares during the most dangerous pandemic yet.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic foreshadows how a future bioweapons attack would unfold without proper preparation. Planning for a bioweapons attack is incredibly difficult bioweapons can be delivered by states or terrorist groups, originate from existing agents or from scratch, and can be delivered in a number of different ways. While establishing a permanent military joint task force with appropriate funding is an achievable first step, combined efforts in deterrence, disruption, and defense are key in anticipating these variables of an attack and surviving it once unleashed.

Lt. Andrea Howard is a nuclear submarine officer aboard the USS Ohio. Following her graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy in 2015, she was a Marshall Scholar at the University of Oxford and Kings College London, where she focused on the intersection of technology, security, and diplomacy in weapons of mass destruction policy. Lt. Howard won the U.S. Naval Institutes 2019 Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Essay Contest and is a member of the Seattle Chapter of the Truman National Security Project.

Image: North Carolina Air National Guard (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Julianne Showalter)

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The Pandemic and America's Response to Future Bioweapons - War on the Rocks

Looking for more Marvel things to add to your ever-growing Disney+ queue? For the month of May, two Marvel series are hitting the streaming service and theyre perfect to watch solo, with your family, or with friends hundreds of miles away watch-along, anyone?

Fury Files drops on Disney+ on Friday, May 15, and you shouldnt be surprised that Nick Fury has files on every single Marvel Super Hero. Fury Files gives viewers top-secret access to S.H.I.E.L.D. intel on key Marvel heroes and villains. All of this is told by none other than the mysterious Fury, bringing together a mix of animation and motion comic art! Looking to download a bunch of information about every single hero? Furys got you covered.

If youve already watched the first season of Marvel's Future Adventures on Disney+, get ready for the second. All 13 episodes of Season 2 land on Disney+ on May 22, 2020. Marvels Future Avengers follows Makoto, a young boy who developed superpowers from a Hydra genetic engineering experiment, and his friends Adi and Chloe as they train under Earth's Mightiest Heroes as apprentices, dubbing themselves the "Future Avengers."

[!youtube=VLrFf-T2ef4]

These two series join an ever-growing roster of Marvel movies, series, and shorts you can watch on Disney+. Whether youre looking to watch something from the Marvel Cinematic Universe or relive animated shows from your childhood, theres something for everyone!

Disney+ offers subscribers high-quality and commercial-free viewing, up to four concurrent streams, unlimited downloads on up to ten devices, personalized recommendations, and the ability to set up to seven different profiles. Additionally, parents have the ability to set Kids Profiles that create an easy-to-navigate interface to access age-appropriate content.

Sign up for Disney+ and start streaming now! And be sure to follow Disney+ on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram for more.

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Heres What's Coming from Marvel on Disney+ in May - Marvel Entertainment

The Covid-19 pandemic that has swept the globe has led to a massive search for a drug with which to combat this deadly virus, yet despite many pharmaceutical companies continuing to pour their resources into a cure for this virus, the development of prophylactic vaccines for Covid-19 appears to be lagging.

According to GlobalDatas Pharma Intelligence Center Pipeline Database and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) dashboard, there are, as of 23 April, 80 therapeutic drugs in Phases I, II, and III that may be able to treat Covid-19, but only nine prophylactic vaccine drugs in Phases I and II, indicating that while a possible cure for Covid-19 may be imminent, a prophylactic vaccine to combat the pandemic may need more time to come to fruition.

The response from pharma and biotech companies globally to finding a Covid-19 vaccine has contributed to 438 unique drugs to treat Covid-19: 298 therapeutic drugs and 140 prophylactic vaccines, spread across all stages of development (Discovery, Preclinical, Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III), which is especially remarkable considering that the virus was only identified at the beginning of this year. In these unprecedented times, this massive pipeline in such a short time is demonstrative of the pharmaceutical industry compiling resources and talent, to finding a drug to combat this pandemic of the Covid-19 virus.

Therapeutic drugs account for two thirds of the entire pipeline, with prophylactic vaccines accounting for the remaining third of the current Covid-19 pipeline. Therapeutic drugs have 73% of their pipeline in early-stage development (Preclinical and Discovery) and 27% in late-stage development (Phases I, II, and III); despite the majority of drugs being in early stages, there is a viable pipeline of late-stage drugs that may in the coming months offer a solution to the ongoing crisis. The key drugs to watch are two small moleculebased drugs, remdesivir by Gilead Sciences Inc. and favipiravir by Fujifilm Toyama Chemical Co Ltd, and sarilumab, a monoclonal antibody by Regeneron Pharmaceutical, all three of which are currently in Phase III. At the same time as they are being developed for the Covid-19 virus, these drugs are also being developed for multiple other indications.

In direct contrast, the prophylactic vaccine pipeline largely comprises drugs in early-stage development, with 94% of the pipeline. There are currently only three drugs in Phase II, the current highest stage of development for prophylactic vaccine pipeline. These three Covid-19 vaccines are being developed by Sinovac Biotech Ltd, the University of Oxford, and the third vaccine, named CIGB-2020, is being developed by the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology. This huge disparity in late-stage and early-stage development is indicative of a lack of focus within the industry for vaccines in comparison to the therapeutic drugs pipeline. The massive global response towards the coronavirus and the massive increase in the therapeutic pipeline, however, does mean that this state of affairs is liable to change in the coming weeks. As this pandemic continues and governments and pharmaceutical companies continue to look for ways to combat Covid-19, the therapeutic landscape is sure to change, but as of now any hopes for a fast vaccine may not materialize.

You can view more information on the Covid-19 therapeutic landscape on GlobalDatas Pharma Intelligence Center Pipeline Database and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) dashboard where the most up-to-date and latest information on drugs, trials, and news on Covid-19 can be found.

GlobalData is this websites parent business intelligence company.

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Covid-19 treatment on the horizon but vaccine remains elusive - Pharmaceutical Technology

In this report, the Global Cell Culture Market is valued at USD 11,210.7 million in 2015 and growing at a CAGR of over 10% between 2017 and 2025.Cell Culture Market , published by Xpodence Research, provides extensive insight and analysis of the Cell Culture Market over the next eight years (2015-2025) and acts as a vital point of reference for operators or suppliers.Increasing R&D activities of healthcare, biological, and stem cell applications has enhanced the demand of molecular biological activities which is further projected to persist a vibrant aspect for market growth. Cell culture technology includes several complications including raw material supply and fully traceable botanical extracts. Also, growing attention on certifying regulatory compliances associated with environmental sustainability can impede the efficacy of the technology.

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Additionally, affluence from various applications such as genetic engineering, research model systems, and continuous research related to cellular functions and stem cell research is also expected to drive the cell culture process globally. Few other factors spurring the growth includes rise in life sciences research, cell based technology advancement, cumulative cell based production, and mounting demand of cell based therapies.Rising growth in the number of regulatory approvals for cell culture-based vaccines and increasing funding for cell-based research will also influenced the market positively. Furthermore, growing application of single-use technologies and rising demand for mAbs are few factor projected to spur the market growth. Though, extensive cost involvement in cell culture research, lack of awareness for diagnosis technologies, and high contamination risks may hinder the market growth. Furthermore, optimization & handling of cell-based protocol in vitro studies will defies the market growth.

The report includes Segmentation: On the basis of product, this report displays the revenue, market share and growth rate of each type, primarily split into Consumables Instrument

On the basis on the applications, this report focuses on the status and outlook for major applications, market share and growth rate for each application, including Biopharmaceuticals Drug Development Cancer Research Culture Systems Gene Therapy Toxicity Testing Tissue Culture & Engineering Vaccine Production

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Geographic Segmentation: This report split global market into North America, Europe, Asia Pacific, the Middle East and Africa and Latin America, with revenue (Million USD), market share and growth rate of Cell Culture for these regions, from 2015 to 2025 (forecast)North America: U.S., Rest of North AmericaEurope: Germany, France, UK, rest of EuropeAsia Pacific: China, Japan, India and Rest of Asia PacificMiddle East & Africa: GCC, North Africa, South Africa and Rest of MEALatin America: Brazil and Rest of Latin America

Key players: Overview of market leaders in Cell Culture market by top manufacturers/players, with Cell Culture revenue (Million USD) and market share for each manufacturer/player; the top players including Sartorius AG, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Merck KGaA, Corning Incorporation, Sigma Aldrich Co. LLC, Promocell GmbH, GE Healthcare, Eppendorf AG, Becton, Dickinson & Company and VWR International, LLC.On the basis of end-users, the market shows the revenue, global share and growth rate of each type, majorly divided into

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About Kenneth Research:

Kenneth Research provides market research reports to different individuals, industries, associations and organizations with an aim of helping them to take prominent decisions. Our research library comprises of more than 10,000 research reports provided by more than 15 market research publishers across different industries. Our collection of market research solutions covers both macro level as well as micro level categories with relevant and suitable market research titles. As a global market research reselling firm, Kenneth Research provides significant analysis on various markets with pure business intelligence and consulting services on different industries across the globe. In addition to that, our internal research team always keep a track on the international and domestic market for any economic changes impacting the products demand, growth and opportunities for new and existing players.

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Cell Culture Market : Investigation and Growth Forecast until the End of 2025 Cole Reports - Cole of Duty

Williamsville, NY, April 28, 2020 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- 22nd Century Group, Inc. (NYSE American: XXII) (22nd Century or the Company), a leading plant biotechnology company focused on reduced nicotine tobacco and hemp/cannabis plant genetics research and development, will release first quarter 2020 financial results on Thursday, May 7, 2020, before the market opens. The press release will be available on 22nd Century Groups website at http://www.xxiicentury.com. In conjunction with the earnings release, the Company will host a conference call on Thursday, May 7, 2020, at 8:00 a.m. ET.

The live audio webcast will be accessible in the Events section on the Company's Investor Relations website at http://www.xxiicentury.com/investors. Participants may also listen to the live call by dialing (877) 407-6914. A replay of the call will be available until May 21, 2020 by dialing (877) 660-6853; the passcode is 13702417. An archived replay of the webcast will also be available shortly after the live event has concluded.

Investors, analysts and members of the media interested in submitting questions in advance can do so by sending an e-mail to investorrelations@xxiicentury.com.

About 22nd Century Group, Inc.22nd Century Group, Inc. (NYSE AMERICAN: XXII) is a leading plant biotechnology company focused on technologies that alter the level of nicotine in tobacco plants and the level of cannabinoids in hemp/cannabis plants through genetic engineering, gene-editing and modern plant breeding. The Companys primary mission in tobacco is to reduce the harm caused by smoking by bringing its proprietary reduced nicotine content cigarettes with 95% less nicotine than conventional cigarettes to adult smokers in the U.S. and international markets. The Companys primary mission in hemp/cannabis is to develop proprietary hemp/cannabis plants with unique cannabinoid profiles and desirable agronomic traits and to commercialize those plants through a synergistic portfolio of strategic partnerships in the hemp/cannabis industry.

Learn more atxxiicentury.com, on Twitter@_xxiicenturyand onLinkedIn.

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22nd Century Group to Announce First Quarter 2020 Financial Results on May 7, 2020 - GlobeNewswire

Merck & Co. said today it will partner with the Institute for Systems Biology (ISB) to identify targets for medicines and vaccines against COVID-19 by investigating and defining the molecular mechanisms of the disease and specifically SARS-CoV-2 infection.

While the value of the collaboration was not disclosed in the announcement, Merck and ISB did say they will use a contract awarded to the pharma giant in 2016 by the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). That contract (HHSO100201600031C) has a potential value of $78.5 million ($78,531,649), and was originally awarded August 29, 2016, to advance development of the vaccine candidate V920 against Ebola virus using a recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus vector, according to a contract summary published by GovTribe.

The contract has been extended from its scheduled end of May 31, 2020, through September 30, 2024.

In December, Merck announced FDA approval of the vaccine under the name ERVEBO (Ebola Zaire Vaccine, Live), indicated for the prevention of disease caused byZaire ebolavirusin individuals 18 years of age and older.

Merck said it had agreed to provide research funding and work with researchers at ISB to characterize targets for potential therapeutic intervention and vaccine development.

Through the collaboration with Merck, scientists from ISB, health workers from the Swedish Medical Center, and a consortium of research organizations and biomedical companies plan to analyze blood samples and nasal swabs from Swedish Medical Center patients with SARS-CoV-2 using samples from several time points that include initial presentation, acute illness and convalescence.

Merck and ISB said proteomic, metabolomic, transcriptomics and genetic techniques will be applied toward examining blood samples, with the aim of evaluating the impact of infection on different organs, and identifying potential biomarkers to predict the risk of severe disease.

In addition, samples will be analyzed to create a profile of the immune response, including quantitative changes in immune cells in patients following SARS CoV-2 infection and characterization of neutralizing antibodies in samples from convalescent patients. These insights can be used to inform vaccine design and antibody therapy, Merck and ISB reason.

The study will initially analyze samples from 200 patients with the potential to expand to 300, Merck and ISB said.

The announcement is Mercks first regarding development of a potential COVID-19 therapeutic. Last month, Merck announced donations of 500,000 personal protective masks to New York City Emergency Management and 300,000 masks to New Jerseys Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, both toward urgent efforts to address COVID-19 emergency response.

This collaboration with Merck provides critical support for the recently launched scientific trial being co-led by ISB and Swedish Medical Center, both part of the Providence St. Joseph Health network. We launched this trial with the urgent need to improve our understanding of COVID-19, James R. Heath, PhD, president and professor at ISB, said in a statement. By applying the full power of our systems biology capabilities, we hope to gain important insights into the molecular basis for the dramatically contrasting outcomes observed for patients infected with SARS-CoV-2.

Heath and Jason D. Goldman, MD, at Swedish Medical Center, will be the studys principal investigators.

Initial funding support for the study came from the Wilke Family Foundation, M.J. Murdock Charitable Trust, Swedish Foundation, Parker Institute for Cancer Immunotherapy, and Washington State Andy Hill CARE Fund. Other research collaborators on the study include Stanford University, Adaptive Biotechnologies, Bloodworks Northwest, Isoplexis, Metabolon, Nanostring, Olink, Providence Molecular Genomics Laboratory, Scisco Genetics and 10x Genomics.

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Merck & Co. Partnering with ISB to Study Targets for COVID-19 Therapeutics - Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News

Williamsville, NY, April 28, 2020 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- 22nd Century Group, Inc. (NYSE American: XXII) (22nd Century or the Company), a leading plant biotechnology company focused on reduced nicotine tobacco and hemp/cannabis plant genetics research and development, will release first quarter 2020 financial results on Thursday, May 7, 2020, before the market opens. The press release will be available on 22nd Century Groups website at http://www.xxiicentury.com. In conjunction with the earnings release, the Company will host a conference call on Thursday, May 7, 2020, at 8:00 a.m. ET.

The live audio webcast will be accessible in the Events section on the Company's Investor Relations website at http://www.xxiicentury.com/investors. Participants may also listen to the live call by dialing (877) 407-6914. A replay of the call will be available until May 21, 2020 by dialing (877) 660-6853; the passcode is 13702417. An archived replay of the webcast will also be available shortly after the live event has concluded.

Investors, analysts and members of the media interested in submitting questions in advance can do so by sending an e-mail to investorrelations@xxiicentury.com.

About 22nd Century Group, Inc.22nd Century Group, Inc. (NYSE AMERICAN: XXII) is a leading plant biotechnology company focused on technologies that alter the level of nicotine in tobacco plants and the level of cannabinoids in hemp/cannabis plants through genetic engineering, gene-editing and modern plant breeding. The Companys primary mission in tobacco is to reduce the harm caused by smoking by bringing its proprietary reduced nicotine content cigarettes with 95% less nicotine than conventional cigarettes to adult smokers in the U.S. and international markets. The Companys primary mission in hemp/cannabis is to develop proprietary hemp/cannabis plants with unique cannabinoid profiles and desirable agronomic traits and to commercialize those plants through a synergistic portfolio of strategic partnerships in the hemp/cannabis industry.

Learn more atxxiicentury.com, on Twitter@_xxiicenturyand onLinkedIn.

###

Mei Kuo22nd Century Group, Inc.(716) 300-1221mkuo@xxiicentury.com

John MillsICR(646) 277-1254john.mills@icrinc.com

Deirdre ThomsonICR(646) 277-1283deirdre.thomson@icrinc.com

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22nd Century Group to Announce First Quarter 2020 Financial Results on May 7, 2020 - Yahoo Finance

One of the more popular claims by critics of GMOs is that only a few countries grow genetically engineered crops, led by the United States, Canada, Brazil and Argentina. Thats just not true. Its a worldwide phenomenon, and breakthroughs continued this year with the introduction of GMO crops in Kenya and Nigeria, and the anticipated rollout of Golden Rice in the Philippines.

To set the record straight, the Genetic Literacy Project has released Where GMO Crops are Grown, a combination of two linked infographics that illustrate the explosive growth worldwide in the use of transgenic seeds over the past three decades. [click on infographic to display pdf]

Designed by GLP data visualization specialist Kayleen Schreiber, the graphics document the introduction of 22 different crops developed in 41 different countries through transgenics (GMO), gene editing or other New Breeding Techniques. As the first of the two infographics illustrate, not all the countries that have introduced genetically modified crops over the past 28 years are still growing them, and some countries that still grow them have discontinued various crops for political or economic reasons.

For example, the first GMO crop commercialized in the US was the FLAVR SAVR tomato, engineered to extend its shelf life and minimize fruit softening. It fell short of expectations and its producer, Calgene, discontinued sales. Currently, 28 nations grow nearly 200 million hectares of genetically engineered plants every year, a roughly 113-fold increase from 1.7 million hectares in 1996. Biotech crops are the fastest-adopted technology in the history of modern agriculture.

The second infographic can be accessed by clicking on the purple box on the right side of the map, which launches an animation documenting when each of the 41 countries commercialized its first biotech crop. [click on infographic to display pdf]

The two graphics can be downloaded together here, or you can download each graphic separately: Where GMO Crops are Grown or 41 Countries Planted Their First Genetically Altered Crop, 1992-2020.

An evolving story emerges from these infographics. While many nations have embraced genetic engineering and never looked back, 13 of 41 countries have stopped cultivating biotech crops altogether. Burkina Faso, for example, under huge political pressure, halted the cultivation of GMO insect-resistant Bt cotton in 2015, leaving its farmers to face increased pesticide exposure and higher production costs.

Meanwhile, other nations, like China, are close to green-lighting many different plant varieties, and import many GMO crops, but currently only allow their farmers to grow a limited number of genetically engineered crops. Because of this tangled regulatory web, just five nationsthe US, Canada, Brazil, Argentina and Indiacultivate roughly 90 percent of the worlds total biotech crop acreage.

Kayleen Schreiber, neuroscientist and science communicator, is director of the GLPs gene-editing tracker and index. Follow her on Twitter @KSPHD.

Cameron J. English is the GLPs senior agricultural genetics and special projects editor. Follow him on Twitter @camjenglish

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Where are GMO crops grown? GLP infographics document the global growth of agricultural biotechnology innovation - Genetic Literacy Project

DURHAM, N.C., April 28, 2020 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Precision BioSciencesInc. (Nasdaq: DTIL), a life sciences company dedicated to improving life through the application of its pioneering, proprietary ARCUS gene editing platform, today announced that the Company and its collaborators will present at the upcoming American Society of Genetic & Cell Therapy (ASGCT) Annual Meeting held virtually May 12-15, 2020.

The abstracts being presented by Precision and our collaborators this year at ASGCT underscore the differentiated capabilities of our proprietary ARCUS genome editing platform and the breadth of our emerging pipeline applying this technology in vivo, commented Derek Jantz, Chief Scientific Officer and co-founder of Precision BioSciences. These presentations demonstrate the specificity and versatility of ARCUS-driven genome editing in a variety of large animal models and provide further preclinical evidence of potentially meaningful and durable therapeutic impact on a range of genetic and infectious diseases. As we continue to validate ARCUS potential in vivo, we are focused on advancing our gene correction pipeline. We look forward to selecting a clinical candidate for our wholly owned PH1 program, expected in 2020, and, in partnership with Gilead, developing a potential cure for chronic hepatitis B infection, for which submission of an IND is currently targeted for 2021.

Precision BioSciences Presentations:

Title:Engineering a Self-Inactivating Adeno-Associated Virus (AAV) Vector for ARCUS Nuclease DeliveryPoster Session: Gene Targeting and Gene Correction, Abstract: 654Presenting Author: Hui Li, Ph.D., Precision BioSciences

Title:A Gene Editing Approach to Eliminate Hepatitis B Virus Using ARCUS MeganucleasesPoster Session: Gene Targeting and Gene Correction, Abstract 1057Presenting Author: Cassie Gorsuch, Ph.D., Precision BioSciences

Partnered Presentations:

Title: Therapeutic Efficacy of ARCUS Meganuclease Gene Editing - Arrest of Rod Degeneration and Restoration of Rod Function in a Transgenic Pig Model of Autosomal Dominant Retinitis PigmentosaOral Presentation: Gene Therapy for the Special Senses, Abstract 2Date/Time: Tuesday, May 12, 2020, 10:30 10:45 a.m. ESTPresenting Author: Maureen Ann McCall, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences, University of Louisville

Title: Evaluation of the Long-term Effects of AAV-Meganuclease Genome Editing of PCSK9 in Macaque LiverOral Presentation: Evaluating Genome Editing Activity and Precision, Abstract 518Date/Time: Wednesday, May 13, 2020, 4:00 4:15 p.m. ESTPresenting Author: Lili Wang, Ph.D., Research Director, Discovery Research and Gene Editing, Research Associate Professor, Department of Medicine, Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania

All abstracts for the ASGCT 2020 Meeting are available online at ASGCT Annual Meeting Abstracts.

About Precision BioSciences, Inc.Precision BioSciences is dedicated to improving life (DTIL) through its proprietary genome editing platform, ARCUS. Precision leverages ARCUS in the development of its product candidates, which are designed to treat human diseases and create healthy and sustainable food and agriculture solutions. Precision is actively developing product candidates in three innovative areas: allogeneic CAR T immunotherapy, in vivo gene correction, and food. For more information regarding Precision, please visitwww.precisionbiosciences.com.

Forward-LookingStatementsThis press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements contained in this press release that do not relate to matters of historical fact should be considered forward-looking statements, including the timing of trials and results from clinical and non-clinical studies of our in vivo gene correction program and the safety, efficacy and delivery of our ARCUS genome editing technology. In some cases, you can identify forward-looking statements by terms such as anticipate, believe, could, expect, should, plan, intend, estimate, target, mission, may, will, would, should, could, target, project, predict, contemplate, potential, or the negative thereof and similar words and expressions.

Forward-looking statements are based on managements current expectations, beliefs and assumptions and on information currently available to us. Such statements are subject to a number of known and unknown risks, uncertainties and assumptions, and actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied in the forward-looking statements due to various important factors, including, but not limited to, our ability to become profitable; our ability to procure sufficient funding and requirements under our current debt instruments; our limited operating history; the success of our programs and product candidates; our dependence on our ARCUS technology; the initiation, cost, timing, progress and results of research and development activities, preclinical or greenhouse studies and clinical or field trials; our or our collaborators ability to identify, develop and commercialize product candidates; our or our collaborators ability to advance product candidates into, and successfully complete, clinical or field trials; our or our collaborators ability to obtain and maintain regulatory approval of our product candidates, and any related restrictions, limitations and/or warnings in the label of an approved product candidate; the laws and regulatory landscape that will apply to our and our collaborators development of product candidates; our ability to achieve our anticipated operating efficiencies as we commence manufacturing operations at our new facility; delays or difficulties in enrolling patients in clinical trials; our ability to obtain and maintain intellectual property protection for our technology and any of our product candidates; potential litigation relating to infringement or misappropriate of intellectual property rights; if our product candidates do not work as intended or cause undesirable side effects the potential for off-target editing or other adverse events, undesirable side effects or unexpected characteristics associated with any of our product candidates; risks associated with applicable healthcare, data privacy and security regulations and our compliance therewith; the rate and degree of market acceptance of any of our product candidates; the success of our existing collaboration agreements; our ability to enter into new collaboration arrangements; public perception about genome editing technology and its applications; competition in the genome editing, biopharmaceutical, biotechnology and agricultural biotechnology fields; potential manufacturing problems associated with any of our product candidates; pending and potential liability lawsuits and penalties related to our technology, our product candidates; the outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19); our current and future relationships with third parties; our ability to effectively manage the growth of our operations; our ability to attract, retain, and motivate key scientific and management personnel; effects of natural or manmade disasters, public health emergencies and other natural catastrophic events; insurance expenses and exposure to uninsured liabilities; market and economic conditions; dilution and fluctuations in our stock price; and other important factors discussed under the caption Risk Factors in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, as supplemented by the risk factor contained in our Current Report on Form 8-K filed with the SEC on April 6, 2020, as any such factors may be updated from time to time in our other filings with the SEC, which are accessible on the SECs website atwww.sec.gov.

All forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this press release and, except as required by applicable law, we do not plan to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements contained herein, whether as a result of any new information, future events, changed circumstances or otherwise.

Investor Contacts:Nick RiddlePrecision BioSciencesTel. (919) 314-5512IR@precisionbiosciences.com

Josh RappaportStern Investor RelationsTel. (212) 362-1200josh.rappaport@sternir.com

Media Contact:Maurissa MessierPrecision BioSciencesTel. (919) 314-5512media@precisionbiosciences.com

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Precision BioSciences Announces Presentations at the American Society of Gene & Cell Therapy 23rd Annual Meeting - BioSpace

Ms. Salitsky joins 4THBIN from The Chemours Company, where she held the role of Global Communications Director for Chemours' Fluoroproducts business and led crisis and issues communications for the company. During her tenure at Chemours, she was responsible for developing the company's strategic brand and marketing agenda for six of the company's seven power brands. Prior to joining Chemours, Ms. Salitsky spent twenty years with AstraZeneca, where she held numerous communication leadership roles, including Head of Enablement for Global R&D Communications,Head of Key Account Management and Communication Excellence, Global R&D and Director, R&D PR-Communication Strategy.Ms. Salitsky holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Genetic Engineering from Cedar Crest College and completed the Wharton Management Program at the University of Pennsylvania.

With over 25 years of experience, Ms. Salitsky has a unique blend of expertise in communications, sales and marketing, strategic planning as well as managerial and operational excellence. Her career is marked with critical roles in several 'start up' functions and capabilities within an organization, making her a perfect fit for 4THBIN.

"We are delighted to have someone of Cynthia's caliber and experience join our team," said Paul Kirsch, CEO and Co-founder of 4THBIN. "4THBIN has experienced exponential growth over the past couple of years, and Cynthia's experience will help us continue to expand our market reach and drive future growth."

"I couldn't be more excited to join such an amazing team that is truly passionate about making a difference and executing on its promise to deliver sustainable and secure e-recycling and data destruction solutions to today's leading industries," said Salitsky.

About 4THBIN

4THBIN is a certified and secure e-recycling solution provider to over 6,000 businesses from Fortune 100 companies to start-ups across the United States.We provide certified data destruction support to today's top industries and help them deliver on their corporate social responsibility commitments by ensuring their e-waste is sustainably and legally recycled. We are certified and accredited by the industry's most rigorous and trusted institutions for data security and sustainability.4THBIN was New York City's first company to be certified by e-Stewards and has received Evovadis' platinum rating, placing 4TBIN in the top 1% of their most responsible companies. For more information, we invite you to visit 4THBIN.comor follow ups on Twitter @4THBINor LinkedIN.

Media Contact:Kira Perdue[emailprotected]404-556-0062

SOURCE 4THBIN

http://www.4THBIN.com

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4THBIN Appoints Cynthia Salitsky as Chief Marketing Officer to Support Market Expansion and Drive Growth - PRNewswire

There is widespread agreement that the only way to safely reopen the economy is through a massive increase in testing. The US needs to test millions of people per day to effectively track and then contain the covid-19 pandemic.

This is a tall order. The country tested only around 210,000 people per day last week, and the pace is not increasing fast enough to get to millions quickly.

The urgency to do better is overwhelmingly bipartisan, with the most recent legislation adding $25 billion for testing a few days ago. Fears are growing, however, that testing might not scale in time to make a difference. As Senators Lamar Alexander and Roy Blunt wrote last week, We have been talking with experts across the government and the private sector to find anyone who believes that current technology can produce the tens of millions of tests necessary to put this virus behind us. Unfortunately, we have yet to find anyone to do so.

We believe that it can be done. The scientific community has the technological capabilities today to test everyone who needs it and enable people to come back to work safely.

To be clearthe senators are right that simply scaling up current practices for covid testing is insufficient. However, with a bit of innovation, the US can meet the need without inventing entirely new technologies. The necessary scale can be achieved by deploying the fruits of the last decade of innovation in biology, including the dizzying advances in DNA sequencing, genetic engineering, industrial automation, and advanced computation.

We speak from experience. We have worked with and helped engender many of these technologies across academia and industry. Scaling them for widespread testing will require investment, infrastructure, and determination, but nothing technologically or logistically infeasible.

Tests for mass screening may have different requirements and characteristics from the tests run in clinical labs today that are approved by the Food and Drug Administration. So what might a solution look like?

It must be scalable, meaning tens or hundreds of thousands of tests per day per facility, or at-home tests. It must be sensitive to early stages of infection, detecting the actual virus rather than immunity to it. And it must be less bound by health insurance and regulatory constraints, to allow fast and broad testing, contact tracing, and isolation. These differences do not mean lower standards. In fact, screening at this scale will require stringent requirements for safety, accuracy, and reliability.

The life sciences community is rising to the challenge. We are repurposing our labs to advance new centralized and at-home methods that solve the bottlenecks preventing testing from reaching global scale. This community is moving fast, with shared purpose and a commitment to open collaboration. As a result of these efforts, several promising avenues are emerging.

Some rely on DNA sequencing tools that have improved a million-fold since the completion of the Human Genome Project nearly 20 years ago. Not only can these tools now read trillions of base pairs of human DNA every day, but they can be readily repurposed to test for the presence of coronavirus at mass scale, using instruments that already exist across the country. Some methods, such as SHERLOCK and DETECTR, harness CRISPR DNA and RNA recognition tools to enable rapid, distributed testing in doctors offices and at other sites. Other efforts are removing critical bottlenecks, such as sample purification, to make the existing approaches more scalable.

There are additional possibilities, and the US needs to place bets on several of them at the same time. Some of those bets might fail, but the severity of the moment requires that we try. Chances are, we will need more than one of them.

As important as the diagnostic technology itself is the need to fuel innovation at all stages of the testing process, including sample collection, regulation, logistics, manufacturing, distribution, scale-up, data infrastructure, and billing. These are solvable problems. The solutions may sometimes differ from current clinical testing conventions, but these are not conventional times.

Maybe cotton swabs or saliva can be used for collection rather than traditional nasopharyngeal swabs, which are in critically short supply. Maybe mass screening tests dont have to have the tested persons name and date on every collection tube but could instead include a bar code that you snap a picture of with your phone. Maybe these tests can be self-administered at home or work rather than conducted by trained professionals in clinical settings. Maybe samples from low-risk, asymptomatic people can be pooled together for initial testing and further screened only in the event of a positive result. This would allow many more samples to be analyzed at once.

State or federal regulatory agencies could make these adjustments to conventional practices more easily if they were willing to treat mass screening for bringing people back to work differently from the testing used in clinical settings. In addition, mass screening efforts will require unconventional partnerships with private companies, nonprofits, universities, and government agencies to support the logistics, collection, manufacturing, scale-up, and data infrastructure to make such a system possible. All this can be done, and some of it is already starting to be donebut we must not lose hope.

The United States capabilities in the life sciences and information technology are unmatched in the world. The time is now to rapidly build a massively scaled screening program that will save lives while allowing us to reopen our economy and keep it open. This can be done, but it will require urgency and determination to make multiple, simultaneous bets on infrastructure, regulation, and technology, as well as collaboration to put it all together.

We have united before to face far greater challenges as a nation, and we can do so again.

Sri Kosuri is cofounder and CEO of Octant and an associate professor in the Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry at UCLA. Feng Zhang is the James and Patricia Poitras Professor of Neuroscience at MITs McGovern Institute, a core member of the Broad Institute, a Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigator, and cofounder of Sherlock Biosciences. Jason Kelly is cofounder and CEO of Ginkgo Bioworks. Jay Shendure is a Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigator at the University of Washington School of Medicine and scientific director of the Brotman Baty Institute.

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The US already has the technology to test millions of people a day - MIT Technology Review